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THE PROCESS OF PENAL LAW REFORM-
A LOOK AT THE PROPOSED MICHIGAN
REVISED CRIMINAL CODE
JEROLD H. ISRAEL t
T HE subject of this symposium, the proposed Michigan Revised
Criminal Code (Proposed Code),' is the product of a three-year
study by a Joint Committee of the State Bar. The study was under-
taken pursuant to a 1964 resolution of the State Bar Commissioners
calling for a "complete revision of the criminal code to redefine crimes
and penalties."'2 The Joint Committee is an extraordinarily large group,
being composed of members of both the standing Criminal Jurispru-
dence Committee and the Special Code Revision Committee.' Its mem-
bership reflects great diversity in viewpoint and professional interests,
including not only prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges, but
also corrections officials, police officers and clergymen. The Proposed
Code is a product of the total committee and naturally reflects the
give-and-take of any group effort of this type. Not every committee
member agreed with every section, but they all concluded that the
Proposed Code, taken as a whole, would represent a vast improve-
ment over the current law. The objective of this article is to explain,
in a general fashion, the basis for that conclusion.
f Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.B.A. 1956, Western Reserve Univer-
sity; LL.B. 1959, Yale University.
The author served as reporter for chapters 4, 10, 45-50 and 63 of the Proposed
Code. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the position of the Joint Com-
mittee. In fact, the article will not have been read by the chairman or any other member
of the Committee prior to publication. Representations concerning various arguments
advanced within the Committee and information advanced to the Committee are based
on the personal recollections of the author as well as Committee minutes.
1. Published in September 1967 by West Publishing Company. Copies may be ob-
tained, if still available, from the offices of the State Bar, Lansing, Michigan. Alternative
Draft proposals adopted on December 2, 1967, are also available from the State Bar.
Throughout this article, the Proposed Code will be cited as Mich. Rev. Crim. Code (Final
Draft 1967).
2. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code, Committee Foreword, at III (Final Draft 1967). See also
Gilmore, Special Committee for the Revision of the Criminal Code, 45 Mich. S.B.J. 32
(Apr. 1966).
3. The Committee was chaired by Judge Horace W. Gilmore. Vice chairmen were
Fred K. Persons and Judge Donald S. Leonard, both former chairmen of the Committee
on Criminal Jurisprudence. Total membership exceeded 100 persons, although not all
participated in the drafting and discussion sessions.
4. The Committee also included several general practitioners, who rarely handled
criminal cases, state legislators, representatives of the attorney general's and governor's
legal staffs, the Deans of the four Michigan law schools, criminal law teachers, and
psychiatrists. The total membership is listed in the foreword to the final draft.
HeinOnline  -- 14 Wayne L. Rev. 772 1967-1968
THE PRocEss OF PENAL LAW REFORM
I
THE NEED FOR REVISION
The commissioners' call in 1964 for a complete revision of the
criminal law was hardly radical or unprecedented. 5 There are move-
ments in the field of law reform just as there are movements in the
fields of art and politics; and revision of the substantive criminal law
is clearly "the" law reform movement of the sixties. Over half the
states have undertaken revisions of their criminal law in the last
several years,6 and a few had already completed the project, quite
successfully, when the bar commissioners issued their resolution.' In
part, this new emphasis on criminal law revision has been a product
of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which provided
the first practical working model for code revision in over fifty years.8
The main impetus, however, has come from a dramatic increase in
criminal law litigation, clearly revealing the great degree to which our
current law suffers from the infirmities of old age.9
On the basis of old age, the Michigan criminal code is probably
as ripe for revision as any. Although our present criminal code is listed
in the statute books as the Penal Code of 1931,10 it might more accu-
rately be described as the Penal Code of 1846,11 supplemented by
mostly minor additions in 1931. For in large part, the 1931 revision
simply codified, consolidated and repeated the provisions of the initial
5. The commissioners action was later endorsed by the Senate in S. Con. Res. 157,
73d Leg., Reg. Sess., vol. 1, at 118 (1966), adopted by the House in H.R., Reg. Sess.,
vol. 1, at 151-52 (1966).
6. A Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 126 (1967); see Robinson,
Revisionists of the States Unite, 5 Am. Crim. L.Q. 178 (1967).
7. Basic revisions had already been completed, for example, in Wisconsin, Minnesota,
and Illinois. See Keeton & Reid, Proposed Revision of the Texas Penal Code, 45 Texas
L. Rev. 399, 405 n.24, 407 (1967).
8. See Wechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations on Its Model
Penal Code, 42 A.B.A.J. 321 (1956), and also Wechsler, Foreword to Symposium on the
Model Penal Code, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 589 (1963). Actually the Wisconsin Code was
completed in 1955 and offered an excellent working model. The ALI project, however, was
started somewhat before then, and the first drafts were issued in 1953, although the
final draft was not adopted until 1962. On the condition of criminal law reform prior
to the ALI venture, see Cohen, Criminal Law Legislation and Legal Scholarship, 16 J.
Legal Ed. 253 (1964). See also Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942, 20 U. Kan.
City L. Rev. 208 (1952).
9. It is interesting to note that the original impetus toward substantive criminal
law reform in the late 1950's and early 1960's preceded most of the Supreme Court deci-
sions broadening the constitutional rights of indigents. See, e.g., Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). But see Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
10. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.1 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.191 (1962).
11. Mich. Rev. Stat. 1846, ch. 151-61.
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code of 1846.12 Ancient vintage, of course, is not always a detriment
in statutory law, but in the case of a detailed criminal code, it often
presents numerous difficulties. For one, the provisions usually are
written in the language and style of another day. The Michigan provi-
sions, for example, tend to be unnecessarily long and intricate, often
using langauge which, while not quite archaic, is hardly within the com-
mon usage of today.13 More significantly, a code adopted largely in
1846 tends to concentrate, naturally enough, upon the problems of
society in 1846. Many of these problems-such as dueling, 4 inciting
Indians to break treaties 5 and advertising cures for venereal disease"0
-are hardly the most pressing issues of today. Changes in social,
economic and political institutions require the extension of criminal
sanctions to new areas and the revision, and sometimes even elimina-
tion, of sanctions in old areas.
Actually even a penal code that had been totally revised in 1931
could not be expected to deal adequately with the vast changes in
society that have occurred in just the last ten or fifteen years. New
developments in the economic structure-the widespread use of credit;
the recognition of new security interests in legislation like the Uniform
Commerical Code; the use of services and rentals as major commodi-
ties on the market; and the creation of new items of value such as
trading stamps and credit cards-would alone require significant
changes in various provisions dealing with the misappropriation and
destruction of property. Similarly, the tremendous expansion in the
operations of government, accompanied by various changes in adminis-
trative functions, would require substantial alterations in the numerous
12. Compare Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.11 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.201 (1962),
with Mich, Rev. Stat. 1846, ch. 153, § 22; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.81 (1948), Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 28.276 (1962), with Mich. Rev. Stat. 1846, ch. 153, § 29; Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.83 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.278 (1962), with Mich. Rev. Stat. 1846, ch. 153,
§ 14; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.117 (1948), Mich. Stat. Anm. § 28.312 (1962), with
Mich. Rev. Stat. 1846, ch. 156, § 7; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.149 (1948), Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 28.346 (1962), with Mich. Rev. Stat. 1846, ch. 156, § 20; Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.249 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.446 (1962), with Mich. Rev. Stat. 1846, ch. 155,
§ 2; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.548 (1954), with
Mich. Rev. Stat. 1846, ch. 153, § 1; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.423 (1948), Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 28.665 (1954), with Mich. Rev. Stat. 1846, ch. 156, § 2.
13. Consider the terminology in the following: Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.339
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.571 (1954); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.342 (1948), Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 28.574 (1954); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.379 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.611 (1954), and the intricacy of: Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.118 (1948), Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 28.313 (1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.125 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.320
(1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750A79 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.747 (1954).
14. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.171 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28368 (1962).
15. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750U48 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.580 (1954).
16. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.40 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.229 (1962).
[Vol. 14
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provisions that affect public administration. Only in the area of physi-
cal violence and wanton depredations against property has the under-
lying institutional setting remained comparatively stable, and, even
here unfortunately, the development of new devices for inflicting harm
make necessary some modification of earlier legislation.
To some extent the changes needed to meet these new develop-
ments could be accomplished through piecemeal amendment of the
1931 code, rather than through a completely new revision. The piece-
meal amendment process has, of course, been relied upon by the
Michigan Legislature for the past thirty-seven years.'7 But this pro-
cess of "continuous revision" through ad hoc legislation has serious
limits.18 For one, it rarely has completely satisfied the need for new
sanctions. Amendments have usually been produced by particular pres-
sures aimed at specific situations and have therefore failed to reflect
the breadth of legislative perspective needed to meet a basic change
in social or economic structure. For example, the Michigan Legisla-
ture has attempted to respond over the years to the developing im-
portance of commercial services by the adoption of a series of provi-
sions dealing with the misappropriation of such services in specific
contexts. Special legislation has been adopted to cover the misappro-
priation of specific services, such as electricity, gas, lodging and the
rental of motor vehicles. 9 While such legislation solved the immediate
problem before the legislature at the time of each amendment, it hardly
met the general gap in the law in dealing with commercial services.
The current code still fails to deal adequately with the less frequently
occurring situations in which other services are misappropriated, such
as where an employee utilizes valuable machinery or the services of
other employees for his own benefit. 0 To provide a satisfactory solu-
tion to the total problem of misappropriating commercial services,
the legislature would have to reconsider the several general provisions
that deal with the improper acquisition of property (e.g., larceny,
17. See, e.g., Mich. Pub. Acts 1967, No. 255, §§ 157m-157u, Mich. Stat.
Ann. §§ 28.354(13)-,354(20) (Supp. 1968) (added in 1967 to meet deficiencies in general
theft and fraud provisions as applied to credit cards).
18. See Remington, Criminal Law Revision Codification vs. Piecemeal Amendment,
33 Neb. L. Rev. 396 (1954).
19. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.282 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.493 (1962)
(utility services); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.292 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.503
(1962) (hotel, inn, restaurant or cafe); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 297, § 362a,
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.594(1) (Supp. 1968) (rental of motor vehicles). Of course, the
general false pretenses provision also includes services, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.218
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.415 (1962), but not all cases involving "theft" of services
will also involve false pretenses.
20. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 3220, Comment (Final Draft 1967).
1968]
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embezzlement, fraudulent conversion and false pretenses), placing
particular emphasis upon the interrelationship of the total group. This
would involve a degree of revision that goes far beyond the past prac-
tice of patching and plugging."1 Moreover, a similar approach would
also be necessary in numerous other areas where piecemeal amend-
ments have provided only partial solutions, such as the application
of perjury and related provisions to the vastly increased number of
application forms, returns and records that must be submitted to the
government and the extension of various public mischief provisions
to the ingenious use of new devices to harass individuals and disrupt
government operations. When all of these areas are totaled it be-
comes obvious that a complete revision is the only satisfactory solu-
tion.
Yet, even if one assumes that piecemeal amendments have filled
and could continue to fill the gaps created by new technological, eco-
nomic and social developments, the heavy burden that the amendment
process has placed on the structure, clarity and consistency of our
criminal code would, in itself, justify a total revision. Almost every
legislative term ten to thirty new provisions imposing significant
criminal penalties have been added to the compiled laws.12 In many
21. See p. 777 infra.
22. For 1966, the following public acts added major criminal provisions: Mich. Pub.
Acts 1966, No. 68, § 493d, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.761(4) (Supp. 1968) (abandonment of
refrigerator with locking device intact); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 69, § 211a, Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 28.408(1) (Supp. 1968) (explosive devices); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 75,
§§ 540c-540d, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.808(3)-.808(4) (Supp. 1968) (device to avoid tele-
communications service charges); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 78, § 297e, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.508(5) (Supp. 1968) (false representation of food products as kosher); Mich. Pub.
Acts 1966, No. 100, § 227a, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.424(1) (Supp. 1968) (carrying of
pistol by off-duty private policeman); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 117, § 17, Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 18.1087 (Supp. 1968) (fraud in the procurement of narcotic drugs); Mich. Pub.
Acts 1966, No. 134, § 12, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 7.456(12) (Supp. 1968) (unlawful use of
document stamps in real property transfer); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 158, §§ 1-2,
Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.746(101)-.746(102) (Supp. 1968) (public officials, willful non-
enforcement of the law); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 166, § 141, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.336
(Supp. 1968) (minor under 17 unaccompanied by parent or guardian allowed to remain
in place where liquor is sold); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 169, §§ 1-6, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§ 14.379(21)-.379(26) (Supp. 1968) (violation of Immunization and Tuberculin Testing
of Children Act); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 215, § 6, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.1106 (Supp.
1968) (Dangerous Drug Act-LSD, hallucinogens); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 218,
§ 15, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.170(15) (Supp. 1968) (unauthorized use of title: "professional
community planner"); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 230, §§ 1-20, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§ 14.447(1)-.447(20) (Supp. 1968) (violation of Public Swimming Pools Act); Mich.
Pub. Acts 1966, No. 234, §§ 1-7, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 17.420(1)-.420(7) (Supp. 1968)
(violation of Emigrant Agent Act); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 235, § 728d, Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 9.2428(4) (Supp. 1968) (falsification of traffic citations); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966,
No. 272, § 414a, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.646(1) (Supp. 1968) (possession of motor
vehicle master key); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 273, § 24, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.137(24)
(Supp. 1968) (violation of Boiler Act); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 296, § 157a, Mich.
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instances, these provisions were not included in the penal code, even
though they created new crimes of a most serious nature. An offense
relating to the unlawful sale of narcotics, for example, would be added
to one of the general narcotic drug acts,23 while provisions prohibiting
forgery of such items as warehouse receipts or liquor tax stamps would
be included respectively in the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act or
the liquor control acts.2 4 Moreover, while these new provisions were
being added here and there, little or no effort was made to repeal
those earlier provisions that deal solely with problems of the past
and no longer serve any useful function, except as a favorite source
of material for the humorist. The result is a basic criminal law without
any consistent framework, scattered throughout the compiled laws and
cluttered with ancient irrelevancies."
This state of disorganization has been further complicated by
the duplication and overlap that has resulted from the narrow range
of most of the piecemeal amendments. Thus, we have today over fifty
Michigan statutes dealing with the offense of perjury, each prohibiting
the same basic act (false swearing) in a different context.2 6 A similar
situation is found in numerous other areas, including trespass, malicious
damage to property and abuse of public office. 27 Lines of distinction
between the separate offenses in these areas often have no or little
relation to the substantive nature of the offense involved. In the tres-
pass area, for example, we have separate provisions prohibiting tres-
pass upon huckleberry and blackberry marshes on the one hand2 8 and
Stat. Ann. § 28.354(1) (Supp. 1968) (conspiracy); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 297,
§ 362a, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.594(1) (Supp. 1968) (larceny of rented tangible property) ;
Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 299, § 479a, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.747(1) (Supp. 1968)
(fleeing from or assaulting an arresting police officer); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 302,
§ 298a, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.509(1) (Supp. 1968) (false advertising of health services
as endorsed by or under supervision of physician); Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 319,
§§ 539a-539i, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.807(1)-.807(9) (Supp. 1968) (eavesdropping); Mich.
Pub. Acts 1966, No. 320, § 7(11) (j), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 7.7(11) (j) (Supp. 1968) (false
affidavit to avoid property tax). For additions during the 1967 term, see Department of
State Police, Digest of Michigan Laws and Amendments Affecting Law Enforcement
(1967).
23. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 335.154 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.1124 (1957).
24. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 444.107 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 19.527 (1964);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 436.46a (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.1017(1) (1957).
25. Compare the following articles commenting on similar inconsistencies in other
states: Brumbaugh, A New Criminal Code for Maryland?, 23 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1963);
Keeton & Reid, supra note 7; and Kessler, An Indictment of the Pennsylvania Penal Code,
29 Pa. B.A.Q. 311 (1958).
26. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4906, Comment (Final Draft 1967) (listing the
various provisions).
27. See Commentaries to Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 2607, 2707, 4806 (Final Draft
1967).
28. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.549 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.817 (1954).
1968]
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cranberry marshes on the other.21 Moreover, these irrelevant distinc-
tions are too frequently accompanied by partially inconsistent defini-
tions of the requisite actus reus or mens rea, as well as considerable
variation in penalty. The various false swearing provisions, for ex-
ample, sometimes do and sometimes do not state that the false state-
ment must meet a "materiality" requirement. 0 And the maximum
punishment provisions for false swearing, even under relatively
similar circumstances, may range from six months imprisonment in
a county jail to fifteen years in a state prison. Thus, false swearing
in a hearing before the insurance commissioner is punishable by
fifteen years,' 1 false swearing in a hearing before a conservation com-
missioner by five years32 and false swearing in a hearing before the race
track commissioner by six months.33 The lack of correlation of penal-
ties is even more striking when one examines the whole range of penal
sanctions as they are allocated to somewhat related, but structurally
different offenses. For example, while perjury before the fire commis-
sioner is punishable by fifteen years imprisonment, 4 bribery of the
same commissioner carries a maximum penalty of only four years.35
In sum, the process of piecemeal amendment of the Michigan code
over the past thirty years, combined with the absence of a thorough
revision for the past 100 years, has produced a penal law that ac-
curately fits Professor Wechsler's often quoted description of Ameri-
can penal law in general:
[O]ur penal codes are fragmentary, old, disorganized and often acci-
dental in their coverage, their growth largely fortuitous in origin,
their form a combination of enactment and of common law that only
history explains. .. [Similarly,] [d]iscriminations that distinguish
minor crime from major criminality, with large significance for the
offender's treatment and his status in society, often reflect a multi-
tude of fine distinctions that have no discernible relation to the ends
that law should serve.3
6
29. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.548 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.816 (1954).
30. Compare Mich. Comp. Laws § 471.26 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 22.346 (1935)
and Mich. Comp. Laws § 117.25 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 5.2104 (1949), with Mich.
Comp. Laws § 455.7 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.667 (1963) and Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 257.903 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 9.2603 (1960).
31. Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.248 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.1248 (1957);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.422 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.664 (1954).
32. Mich. Comp. Laws § 319.11 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 13.139(11) (1967).
33. Mich. Comp. Laws § 43136 (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.966(6)
(Supp. 1968).
34. Mich. Comp. Laws § 29.7 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 4.559(7) (1961); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.423 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.665 (1954).
35. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.117 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.312 (1962); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.503 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.771 (1954).
36. Wechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations on Its Model
Penal Code, 42 A.BA.J. 321, 321-22 (1956).
(Vol. 14
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Admittedly, such defects are not quite as significant in practice
as they may appear on paper. The difficulties created by lack of organi-
zation and clarity are often overcome by the gradually developed ex-
pertise of the lawyer who continuously works with the criminal law.
However, not even the most experienced lawyer is likely to be aware
of every hidden provision or misleading title.317 Similarly, inadequacies
in coverage are usually offset by an ingenious prosecutor, always able
to find some provision somewhere that relates to at least one aspect
of the defendant's conduct, or a tolerant judge, willing to strain the
language of an existing provision to encompass an act that clearly
should be deemed criminal even if the statute might not clearly say so.
So too, gross inconsistencies in penalties for similar acts often are
neutralized by judicious use of plea bargaining. All of this, of course,
comes at a cost-in time, effort and the dignity of the criminal law."8
The State Bar Commissioners, in proposing a total revision of the code,
obviously felt that this was an extravagant expenditure of society's
resources. The committee assigned to draft the Proposed Code clearly
shared that view. Accordingly, its primary goal in revising the criminal
law was to produce a rational, consistent and clearly expressed code that
would facilitate and, indeed, encourage a more efficient and more equi-
table administration of the criminal law.
II
THE CommrrTEE's GoAL
It should be emphasized that the Committee's goal was fairly
limited. The Committee did not view its task as one of general social
reform; no attempt was made to institute any new penal or correc-
tional philosophies.39 Its primary aim simply was to eliminate the
37. As for hidden provisions see, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.306 (1948), Mlich.
Stat. Ann. § 28.538 (1954). The second paragraph of this provision creates a prima fade
presumption that is totally unnecessary for the provision, but would be helpful under such
sections as Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.302 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.534 (1954), and
lich. Comp. Laws § 750.373 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.605 (1954). As for misleading
titles see, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.213 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.410 (1962).
38. It is no answer that this complexity has become familiar to those experi-
enced in the criminal law. Education in the unnecessary intricacies of the
present substantive law takes time and expense which is unwarranted whether
borne by the state, the client, or the lawyer himself. Efficiency of administra-
tion which would result from a rational, consistent and clearly expressed
criminal law ought to result in a saving to both the state and the defendant.
Nowhere is adequate legal assistance at minimum cost needed more than in the
field of criminal law.
Remington, supra note 18, at 401 (footnote omitted).
39. The argument has been advanced that the Proposed Code rejects "retribution"
as a proper basis for imposing punishment. Retribution is not an easily definable term.
Some views of retribution clearly are not adopted in the Proposed Code, but neither
1968)
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structural defects of the present law. The Committee sought first to
improve code organization through elimination of inconsistent, over-
lapping and obsolete sections and rearrangement of the remaining basic
provisions. It sought to avoid the needless complexity of the present
law by restatement of basic offenses in modern language without the
excessive duplication and verbosity of current sections. It attempted
to plug loopholes in coverage by extension of principles incorporated
in present sections, as well as by elimination of technical distinctions
that no longer make any functional sense. At the same time, it also
sought to eliminate potential maladministration by narrowing vague
and overly broad provisions that extended far beyond the basic evil at
which they were aimed. Finally-and for most members this was the
most crucial task-the Committee sought through various devices to
harmonize penalties in accordance with both the severity of the act
involved and the treatment of related offenses.
In large part, these reforms relate more to form than substance.
Moreover, even where a proposed revision is primarily substantive, it
usually reflects only a minor extension or modification of existing
policy. In about ten or twelve instances, however, the Committee did
feel compelled to propose basic changes in substantive policy. Most
of these changes concern the penalty structure, as opposed to the defini-
tion of offenses. In several areas, for example, the Proposed Code
advocates use of new and quite different lines of demarcation in distin-
guishing between higher and lower level offenses. One or two substan-
tial innovations are also suggested in the allocation of sentencing
authority. The few basic changes in the definition of offenses are found
primarily in the general article on sex offenses and the individual provi-
sions on abortion and the justifiable use of force. With the exception
of the change in the abortion law, these proposals probably would have
considerably more theoretical than practical significance. Also, al-
though they do reflect revisions of basic policy, these reforms are all
based on the same fundamental assumptions as underlie our present
law. Proposals for new, non-criminal law oriented approaches to the
treatment of various problems, such as prostitution and narcotics, were
left to be considered by other groups at other times. The changes pro-
posed by the Committee are all based on an evaluation of new develop-
ments in scientific knowledge and institutional settings in the light of
the traditional functions of the criminal law.
Most of the dozen or so basic policy changes contained in the
are they adopted in the current code. Insofar as retribution is defined in terms of
prohibiting morally culpable conduct, the Proposed Code clearly recognizes this concept,
as evidenced by § 105(a) and all of its basic provisions.
[Vol. 14
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Code are discussed at length in the Wayne Law Review's student com-
ments. The Review's concentration on these proposals is entirely
appropriate since they are probably the most intellectually challenging
and clearly the most controversial segments of the Proposed Code.
They are not, however, the crux of the Committee project.40 The
primary significance of the Proposed Code lies in the improvement of
the clarity, organization and correlation of the penal law that stems
from viewing the law as a whole. Accordingly, these are the factors
upon which this article concentrates. It is the first of two articles on
the Proposed Code and will deal primarily with changes in the struc-
ture of the Proposed Code and the definitions of substantive crimes.
A second article will consider the proposals relating to penalties.
A. Improving Organization
The Committee's first task in improving the organization of the
penal law was to engage in a thorough job of statutory housekeeping.
The present penal law consists of approximately 3,500 sections scat-
tered throughout the compiled laws. The Proposed Code provides the
same basic coverage with 350 sections located in a single act." This
dramatic reduction in the bulk of the criminal law was achieved in
several ways. Many provisions dealing with problems of a different
era were eliminated as obsolete. Some, like the prohibition against
using the name of a former president in advertising liquor, simply are
no longer appropriate subjects for the criminal law.42 Others, like the
provisions on dueling and train robberies, would still be covered under
various general offenses but are no longer of sufficient concern to
justify separate provisions.43 Still others, like several provisions on
40. In several areas, alternative proposals have been drafted for legislative considera-
tion should the Committee recommendations be rejected. See note I supra.
41. Of course, not all of the 3,500 provisions replaced by the Proposed Code would
be repealed. At least 1,000 are regulatory provisions that would still be retained, al-
though no longer including separate penalty provisions. See p. 785 infra. Similarly, of the
approximately 770 provisions in the present penal code, approximately 70 would be
transferred to general regulatory provisions, with the remainder being replaced by the
Proposed Code. In sum, including provisions within and without the criminal code,
approximately 1,500 to 2,000 provisions would be repealed.
42. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.42 (194S), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.231 (1962). See
also Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.34 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.223 (1962) (prohibiting
inter alia advertising the restoration of "Lost manhood"); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.102
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.297 (1962) (prohibiting blasphemy); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750348 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.580 (1954) (prohibiting inciting Indians).
43. On dueling see Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.171 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28,368 (1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.173 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.370
(1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.319 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.551 (1954). These
activities would be proscribed by general provisions on assault, misuse of firearms, homi-
cide, etc. On train robberies see Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.514, .516-.517 (1948), Mich.
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criminal syndicalism and obscenity, are clearly unconstitutional under
federal and state court rulings.14 In most instances, these sections had
been partially replaced by later enactments, but the earlier provisions
were never repealed. 45 Still other provisions are no longer necessary
in light of recent judicial developments that would be reaffirmed in the
Proposed Code.46 For example, an extremely narrow interpretation
of the law of attempts once led the legislature to adopt a series of
provisions dealing with specific acts that would today be clearly punish-
able as attempts.47 Thus, a provision prohibiting the arrangement of
combustible material about a building with intent to set it afire could
easily be omitted from the existing code since such activity would now
be treated directly as attempted arson.'
Although considerable legislative deadwood is eliminated, the
most substantial reduction in the present legislative clutter comes
from the, consolidation of various related provisions. About one-half
of the individual sections in the Proposed Code each replace two or
more provisions in the present law. In some areas, such as malicious
damage to property, a single section replaces as many as thirty or
forty of our present provisions.4 9 Ordinarily, wherever a series of
Stat. Ann. §§ 28.782, .784-.785 (1954). These provisions would be replaced by general
provisions prohibiting robbery, theft, etc.
44. Compare Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.142 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.337
(1962), with Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), and Police Comm'r v. Siegel
Enterprises, Inc., 223 Md. 110, 162 A.2d 727 (1960); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.143
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.338 (1962), with Butler v. M\fichigan, 352 U.S. 380
(1957); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.47 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.236 (1962), with
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), and Harris v. Younger, 281 F.
Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.48 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.237 (1962), with Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). But see People v.
Immonen, 271 Mich. 384, 261 N.W. 59 (1935).
45. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.343e (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.575(5) (Supp. 1968), replacing Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.143 (1948), Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 28.338 (1962).
46. Similarly, several provisions were omitted because the subsequent adoption of
federal legislation rendered them obsolete. This was true, for example, of provisions
prohibiting derogatory statements about financial institutions. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code
§ 4240, Comment (Final Draft 1967) (note on commercial slander).
47. Compare People v. Youngs, 122 Mich. 292, 81 N.W. 114 (1899), with People
v. Coleman, 350 Mich. 268, 86 N.W.2d 281 (1957). Coleman cites with approval the
broad view of attempts taken by the California courts. See People v. Miller, 2 Cal. 2d
527, 530-32, 42 P.2d 308, 309-10 (1935).
48. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.77 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.272 (1962). See
also Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.205 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.402 (1962).
49. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 2705-07, Comments (Final Draft 1967), listing
the various statutes replaced by those sections and §§ 2711-12. The malicious destruc-
tion statutes are extremely limited, even to the point of prohibiting destruction of
specific property in a particular location. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 317.283
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 13.1113 (1967) (prohibiting destruction of submarine vegeta-
tion on reserves in Wayne and Monroe counties).
[Vol. 14
HeinOnline  -- 14 Wayne L. Rev. 782 1967-1968
THE PROcEss Or PENAL LAW REFORM
current provisions all prohibit the same basic act and differ only 'as to
the individual subject injured by the act, they are replaced in the
Proposed Code by a general prohibition applicable to the total class
of subjects. Thus, a general provision prohibiting intentional false
alteration of public records replaces a series of individual provisions
prohibiting the alteration of specific records, such as birth records,
school records, retirement system records, etcY0 Of course, in some
cases the difference in affected subject matter so altered the seriousness
of the crime that the several separate provisions could not appropri-
ately be consolidated into one or two general sections.5 Normally,
however, the differences had so little relation to the statutory function
that numerous provisions were easily consolidated in a single section.
Certainly, there was no functional difference between the five provi-
sions prohibiting falsification on applications under the separate state
retirement systems for legislators, state employees, probate judges,
other judges and school employees. 2 Nor could any need be found for
retaining separate provisions prohibiting the act of tampering with
the property of water power companies in the Lower Peninsula, water
companies in the Upper Peninsula, electric or gas power companies
and telephone companies. 3 These and similar provisions were easily
replaced by general sections prohibiting respectively, false statements
in governmental applications for pecuniary benefits 4 and tampering
with the property of utilities.5 Various other sections of the Proposed
Code, praticularly those found in Titles B, C and D (dealing with
offenses against property) perform a similar function.
50. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4555, Comment (Final Draft 1967). Michigan
does have a current provision prohibiting destruction of all public records, Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.491 (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.759 (Supp. 1968), but that
provision does not include false alteration.
51. See, e.g., Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4515, Comment (Final Draft 1967) (failure
to file a required report).
52. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.1058 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 2.169(58) (1961)
(legislators); Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.42 (1948), Mich. State. Ann. § 3.981(42) (1961)
(employees); Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.351 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 15.893(91) (1968)
(school employees); Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.929 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3178
(1962) (probate judges); Mich. Comp. Laws § 38.828 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.125
(28) (1962) (other judges).
53. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 486.112 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 22.1642 (1937)
(water power companies); Mich. Comp. Laws § 486.212 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 22.1662 (1937) (Upper Peninsula power companies); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.282
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.493 (1962) (water, steam, gas and electric power) ; Mich.
Comp. Laws § 484.6 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 22.1415 (1937) (telephone companies).
Insofar as these provisions prohibit malicious destruction or theft of services, they
are replaced by Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 2705-07, 3220 (Final Draft 1967).
54. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4940, Comment (Final Draft 1967). See also id.
§ 4910 (false swearing).
55. Id. § 2711.
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Although consolidation was a very effective means of reducing
legislative clutter, the Committee did not carry this technique to its
logical extreme. For example, while many current offenses that basi-
cally punish only attempts or solicitations to commit a particular crime
were absorbed into the general attempt and criminal solicitation pro-
visions,56 others in the same category were retained as separate pro-
visions because they dealt with crimes so frequently prosecuted that
a separate statute was administratively convenient. Thus, the Proposed
Code contains several forgery provisions although most probably en-
compass no more than an attempted theft by false pretenses. 7 Simi-
larly, where statutes dealt with separate but closely related types of
conduct-as opposed to statutes barring exactly the same conduct as
applied to different subjects-no attempt was made to consolidate if
the provisions were generally recognized as separate offenses serving
even slightly different functions. The one exception in this regard was
in the consolidated theft provision discussed at length in a later Com-
ment in this symposium.5 There, the various provisions combined in
a single section (larceny, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion and
false pretenses) served essentially the same function. The technical
distinctions that separated these offenses-such as the distinction be-
tween taking title without consent and taking a possessory interest
with consent and subsequently converting-had no relationship to the
essential criminality of the act involved. Moreover, as noted in the
Comment on theft offenses, these distinctions create serious procedural
pitfalls which could result in appellate reversals of otherwise proper
convictions. 9 Consolidation in this case accordingly was based as
much on the need to facilitate effective use of the theft provisions
(while affording the defendant adequate notice) as on the need to
eliminate duplication and overlap. Even so, the theft provision also
eliminated a great deal of duplication by combining inter alia a
lengthy series of separate statutes barring embezzlement by such di-
verse parties as bank tellers, railroad conductors, insurance agents,
etc.60
56. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.425 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 2S.667
(1964) (attempting to incite or procuring one to commit perjury). Other provisions
that were included within the general concept of accessorial liability, Mich. Rev. Crim.
Code § 415 (Final Draft 1967), were also omitted. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.424 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.666 (1956) (subornation of perjury).
57. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 4001-07, Comments (Final Draft 1967).
58. See Comment, The Michigan Revised Criminal Code and Offenses Involving
Theft, 14 Wayne L. Rev. p. 969 infra.
59. See id. at 984-85. These difficulties remain despite Mich. Comp. Laws § 767.44
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.984 (1954), and Mich. Comp. Laws § 767.60 (1948),
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1000 (1954).
60. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 3205-08, Comments at 228-29 (Final Draft 1967)
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Aside from reducing the bulk of the criminal law, the Committee
also sought to facilitate efficient utilization of that law by placing
all of the basic criminal provisions within the criminal code. In part,
this was assisted by consolidation since most of the sections eliminated
as merely duplicative of general provisions were located outside the
current code. Other important provisions, however, had to be moved
from various sections of the compiled laws into the Proposed Code.
These included provisions dealing with such subjects as defrauding
judgment creditors and illegal sale of narcotics.61 The only offenses
left out of the Proposed Code were those relating to election laws,
liquor regulation, fish and game laws, and business regulation.6 2 Even
in these areas, however, where it was possible to include a general
penalty provision supporting the various regulations, this was done. For
example, a special section was added making it a misdemeanor to engage
in an occupation for which a license is required without obtaining a
license, or to intentionally engage in a licensed occupation contrary
to any valid regulation. 3 These are essentially "piggyback" or "tie-in"
provisions since their operation depends upon the basic regulatory
statutes that determine when a license is required and what conduct
is contrary to permissible practice in the occupation. 4 Their location
in the criminal code insures that penalties for the several hundred
occupational licensing regulations will be treated with some sense of
consistency as they relate both to each other and to other offenses.
At the same time, proper cross-reference to the criminal code in the
basic regulatory statute will afford adequate notice of potential penal-
ties for violation of the regulations. In sum, although there may be
some provisions that have unintentionally been overlooked, the Pro-
posed Code would reestablish the criminal code as the general source
of the penal law.
The Proposed Code also improves the organization of the criminal
code through a more efficient arrangement of the various offenses
within the code. The present penal code follows an alphabetical list-
(listing the various statutes). The theft section also consolidates a series of provisions
dealing with larceny of specific property, e.g., livestock, trees, railroad passenger tickets,
etc. See id. at 227.
61. See id. §§ 4135, 6005-07 (Final Draft 1967), replacing Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.6085 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.6085 (1962) and Mich. Comp. Laws § 335.152
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.1122 (1957).
62. Current criminal code provisions regulating general business practices would
be moved out of the code. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.354 (194S), Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 28.586 (1954) (insurance with a particular company); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.355 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.587 (1954) (water closets); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.428 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.683 (1954) (fee-splitting by physicians).
63. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 4230-35 (Final Draft 1967).
64. See id., Comments.
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ing of offenses that has been somewhat less than satisfactory. Even
for the experienced prosecutor who realizes that deviate sexual be-
havior might fall under "C" for Crimes Against Nature or "I" for
Indecency and Immorality, there remain idiosyncracies that are not
readily fathomed by either logic or imagination. Setting fire to a pub-
lic hotel is not found under "A" for Arson or "M" Malicious Mischief,
but *under "P" for Public Safety. 5 A fictitious report of a crime to
the police falls under "M" for Miscellaneous if given to the police
directly, but "R" for Radio Broadcast if communicated to a police
broadcasting station. 6 The dumping of garbage in a river falls under
"B" for Breaking and Entering.1
7
The Committee felt that these anomalies were almost inherent
in the alphabetical system. Moreover, that system simply could not
provide the lawyer with a sufficient sense of the interrelationship of
various -offenses to assist him in finding all the sections relevant to a
particular problem. The Proposed Code therefore discards the alpha-
betical listing in favor of a schematic arrangement classifying crimes
according to their basic thrust and relationship to each other. This
type of topical arrangement has been adopted in all of the modern
penal codes and was essentially the arrangement adopted in the origi-
nal Michigan code. The present alphabetical listing was basically the
product of the 1931 compilers, not the original legislature."' As utilized
in the Proposed Code, all offenses are divided into nine major cate-
gories: offenses involving danger to the person (e.g., homicide, as-
sault); offenses involving damage to or intrusion upon property (e.g.,
trespass, burglary, arson); theft and related crimes (e.g., robbery);
forgery and fraudulent practices (e.g., false advertising); offenses
65. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.496 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.764(1) (1954).
.66. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.411a (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.643(1) (1954);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.509 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.777 (1954). Similarly,
furnishing obscene books to children falls under "'C for Children, Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.142 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.337 (1962), but using obscene language in front
of children comes under "I' for Indecency and Immorality, Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.337 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.569 (1954). Also, throwing a stone at a train
comes under "M" for -Malicious Mischief, while uncoupling railroad cars comes under
"R" for Railroads. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.394 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.626
(1954); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.512 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.780 (1954).
67. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110b (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.304(2) (Supp. 1968). Similarly, selling explosives to a minor is placed within the
homicide chapter rather than the chapters on explosives or children. See Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.327a (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.559(1) (Supp. 1968).
68. Th, criminal code was arranged on a topical basis until 1931. See Mich
Comp. Laws tit. 28 (1929). Several of the basic divisions of the Proposed Code are
similar to those used in the 1929 compilation. Compare, e.g., respectively Mich. Comp.
Laws tit. 28, chs. 276, 280, 284 (1929), with Mich. Rev. Crim. Code tit. F, A, D
(Final Draft 1967).
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against public administration (e.g., bribery, perjury); offenses against
public order (e.g., riot); offenses against public health and morals
(e.g., narcotics, obscenity); and offenses against the family (e.g.,
bigamy). Of course, any organization will have its defects, and the
topical arrangement is no exception. One could quarrel at length as
to whether sex offenses should be classified as offenses involving danger
to the person (e.g., forcible rape) or offenses against morals (e.g.,
statutory rape). However, any difficulties of this sort can be handled
by cross-indexing, and experience in other states indicates the topical
arrangement clearly is more efficient, particularly after amendments
are added, than the present system.
B. Making the Code Comprehensible and Complete
Improving the language and structure of individual provisions.
Clarity and simplicity of expression are important attributes of any
law, but they are especially important in our criminal law. For the
criminal law often represents to the public the basic standard for
judging all law. Of course, the layman can hardly expect the criminal
code to be so clear and complete that he never has need for a lawyer,
but he can anticipate that a careful reading .of the code will at least
make evident the main thrust of each crime. Unfortunately, the lan-
guage and structure of many current provisions are so complex as to
confuse not only the layman, but many inexperienced lawyers as
well---a particularly disturbing consequence today when so.much of
the burden of criminal defense work rests with younger, court-appointed
attorneys. The Proposed Code seeks to remedy this difficulty in
several ways.
First, the Proposed Code seeks to follow Justice Traynor's famous
mandate to "rewrite the criminal law in New English.' 17 0 Wherever
possible everyday language is used in describing each offense."' When
69. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.479 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.747
(1954) (resisting officer in discharge of duty); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.131 (1948),
as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.326 (Supp. 1968) (drawing checks -without suffi-
dent funds); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.136 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.331 (1962)
(cruelty to children).
70. Traynor, A Time to Build Up, 35 Cal. S.BJ. 219, 224 (1960).
71. Compare, e.g., Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 2310-25 (Final-Draft 1967), with
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.158 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.355 (1962); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.338 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.570 (1954); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.339
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.571 (1954); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520 (1948), Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 28.788 (1954). Throughout the sex offense area terms like "abominable
and detestable crime against nature," "gross indecency," "debauch" and "carnally
know" were replaced with more common terminology such as "sexual intercourse,"
"sodomy," etc. Similar simplification of language, although involving quite different
terms, was employed in other areas.
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technical terms like "materially false statement" and "deviate sexual
intercourse" are used, they are aways defined at length, substantially
in lay language. 71 In cases where judicial gloss has long made legal
terminology inconsistent with ordinary understanding, the Proposed
Code substitutes new, more accurate terminology. 73 Thus "malice
aforethought," which clearly does not require true malice, 4 is replaced
by a requirement of intent.
Some lawyers have expressed concern that the employment of
"new" terms or specific definitions for old terms will only result in
increased litigation. This hardly seems likely if the courts recognize
that the new definitions are designed merely to restate the current
law in a more comprehensible fashion. Surely, the substitution of a
term like "sexual intercourse" for "carnal knowledge" should not give
rise to serious litigation, particularly since the new definition includes
an explicit statement of the "slight penetration" rule.75 On the con-
trary, experience in other jurisdictions indicates that the increased
clarity of such definitions cuts down on litigation by reducing the areas
for reasonable disputes over statutory interpretation. 70
The Proposed Code also attempts to increase comprehensibility
by eliminating the excessive verbiage so often found in the present
provisions. The current provisions are often repetitive, constantly
referring back to the actor or his subject each time a separate act
is mentioned. Thus, a provision typically will provide that "any per-
son who shall do one act to specified property or any person who shall
72. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 2301(b), 4901(2) (Final Draft 1967).
73. Also, where a legal term has acquired a common lay meaning, inconsistent
with its technical meaning, that term was either not used or was redefined in terms
of its lay meaning. Thus, the striking of another individual, an "assault" by common
usage, is termed an "assault" rather than a "battery." An attempt to strike another is
considered simply an "attempted assault" or possibly "menacing" when the actor in-
tends to place another in fear of imminent injury. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code
§§ 2101-10 (Final Draft 1967). An alternative approach might be to drop the term
"assault" entirely and use only "battery." The main objective was to eliminate any
confusion between an assault and an assault and battery. Compare Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.81 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.276 (1962), with Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.81a
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.276(1) (1962).
74. See, e.g., People v. Hansen, 368 Mich. 344, 350-51, 118 N.W.2d 422, 425-26
(1962); People v. Borgetto, 99 Mich. 336, 339-40, 58 N.W. 328, 329-30 (1894).
75. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 2301(a), 2310-12 (Final Draft 1967).
76. Eight years after their code was enacted, the Louisiana draftsmen said
that the administration of criminal law in Louisiana had greatly improved
and that the new laws had not produced the confusion and uncertainty that
had been predicted. One of the leaders of the Wisconsin revision, in assess-
ing the effect of the new code after seven years' experience, was able to state
that it did not create confusion and that the number of appellate reversals for
error in interpretation of the substantive criminal law had even been reduced.
Keeton & Reid, Proposed Revision of the Texas Penal Code, 45 Texas L. Rev. 399,
407 (1967). Reports from Illinois indicate a similarly enthusiastic response.
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do another to aforesaid property or any person who shall do still
another act to such property shall be guilty of a specific offense.1
77
The Proposed Code eliminates repeated references to the actor and
the property. It simply provides that a person commits a particular
offense if he performs any one of three listed acts to specified prop-
erty. 8 The use of subsections in describing the acts further facilitates
comprehension by immediately indicating that each is a separate
basis for liability.
The Proposed Code also discards the traditional practice of indi-
vidually listing each of the different subjects (i.e., type of actor or
property) protected or regulated by the particular offense.79 Follow-
ing the pattern of recent legislative enactments, 0 those lengthy enu-
merations are replaced with a more inclusive general description of
subjects, often supplemented by a further definition in a special sec-
tion on definitions.8 ' For example, the present larceny provision pro-
hibits stealing any:
money, goods or chattels, or any bank note, bank bill, bond, promis-
sory note, due bill, bill of exchange or other bill, draft, order or cer-
tificate, or any book of accounts for or concerning money or goods
due or to become due, or to be delivered, or any deed or writing con-
taining a conveyance of land, or any other valuable contract in force,
or any receipt, release, or defeasance .... 82
The Proposed Code, on the other hand, simply prohibits the stealing
of "property." That term is then further defined in a separate defini-
tional section as "any money, personal property, real property, thing
in action, evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any
kind."8 3 This arrangement has several advantages. The use of a sepa-
77. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.125 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.320
(1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.131 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.326 (1962);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.491 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.759 (1954).
78. See, e.g., Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 4201, 4555 (Final Draft 1967). The Pro-
posed Code also tends to be more straightforward in its statement of the basic offense
even where there is no need to describe a series of different acts. Compare respectively
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.118 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.313 (1962); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.149 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.346 (1962); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.215 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.412 (1962), with Mich. Rev. Crim. Code
§§ 4705(1)(b), 4530, 4550 (Final Draft 1967).
79. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.115 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.310
(1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.351 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.583 (1954); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.479 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.747 (1954).
80. See Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 319, §§ 539a-539i, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.807(1)-
.807(9) (Supp. 1968).
81. Compare the current sections cited note 79 supra, with Mich. Rev. Crim. Code
§§ 2605, 4205(b), 4506 (Final Draft 1967).
82. See Mich. Pub. Acts 1957, No. 69, § 356, .Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.588 (Supp.
1968).
83. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 3201(i) (Final Draft 1967).
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rate definition makes it possible to provide a much shorter and more
readable description of the total offense; the basic elements of theft
are set out directly and simply, without a long break for a detailed
description of all the objects that might constitute property. The
separate definitional section also promotes a uniform interpretation
of the term "property" throughout the several related provisions that
use that term.84 Finally, the use of a more generalized description of
property as including "any article of value" provides insurance against
any unintended gaps in the enumeration of specific types of protected
property.
8 5
The 'Proposed Code employs a similar drafting technique to re-
duce unneeded (and potentially pernicious) separate listings in de-
scribing the basic acts constituting an offense. For example, the cur-
rent provision on rendering false fire alarms makes it a crime to
knowingly and willfully:
raise a false alarm of fire at any gathering or in any public place,
.. ring any bell or operate any mechanical apparatus, electrical
appartus or combination thereof, for the purpose of creating a false
alarm of fire; raise a false alarm of fire orally, by telephone or in
person 88
Whether or not this listing covers every means of making a false
alarm may be disputed, but it is quite clear that both potential litiga-
tion and unnecessary verbiage could be eliminated by a simple descrip-
tion of the activity this provision seeks to reach. The Proposed Code
attempts to do this by simply defining the basic act as intentionally
"caus [ing] a false alarm ... to be transmitted." 7 This clearly encom-
passes the individual who conveys an alarm either personally or
through another, and, at the same time, makes the provision con-
siderably less complex. Of course, such drafting shortcuts could not
be used in every instance, since many prohibited activities are natu-
rally complex and difficult to describe s8 Yet, the Proposed Code does
84. See id. §§ 3205-08 (theft); id. § 3215 (appropriation of lost property); id.
§§ 3225-27 (theft by failure to make required disposition of property); id. §§ 3245-47
(extortion); id' §§ 3250-53 (receiving stolen property).
85. See the illustration cited in Remington, Criminal Law Revision Codification
vs. Piecemeal Amendment, 33 Neb. L. Rev. 396, 399 (1954).
86. See Mich Pub. Acts 1965, No. 77, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.437 (Supp. 1968).
87. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4535 (Final Draft 1967).
88. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code H3 4001(d)-(g) (Final Draft 1967) (defining the
elements of forgery). Also, when a single current section dealt with separate harmful
activities, the Proposed Code often divided the offense into two sections in order to
make it easier to use and understand. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 75033 (1948),
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.222 (1962); divided into Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 4110, 4115
(Final Draft 1967).
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manage to eliminate totally unnecessary detail and complexity in a
substantial number of provisions. 9
Eliminating Ambiguity. Another target of the Proposed Code is
the unnecessary ambiguity in the current descriptions of many offenses.
A primary source of that ambiguity lies in the current law's rather
haphazard approach to the definition of mens rea. Despite the impor-
tance of mens rea in the criminal law, many current provisions, par-
ticularly those outside the criminal code, make no mention of this
factor.90 In some cases, this is a purposeful omission designed to
create a strict liability offense, but, in many others, it is simply a prod-
uct of legislative oversight.91 The difficulty lies in the fact that one
cannot always be sure in which category a specific provision should
fall. Take, for example, a provision making it a misdemeanor for any
officer to accept fees in excess of that authorized by law.9 It seems
89. Fairly typical is Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.214 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.141 (1962) which currently provides:
Any person who shall wilfully and corruptly demand and receive from another
for performing any service, or any official duty, for which the fee or compensa-
tion is established by law, any greater fee or compensation than is allowed or
provided for the same, and any public officer, for whom a salary is provided
by law in full compensation for all services required to be performed by him,
or by his clerks or deputies, who shall wilfully and corruptly demand and re-
ceive from any person any sum of money as a fee or compensation for any
services required by law to be performed by him in his said office, or by his
clerks or deputies, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ....
Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4710 (Final Draft 1967) provides:
(1) A public servant commits the crime of soliciting unlawful compensation
if he requests a pecuniary benefit for the performance of an official action
knowing that he was required to perform that action without compensation
or at a level of compensation lower than that requested.
(3)Solicitation of unlawful compensation is a Class B misdeanor.
Also, compare respectively Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.465 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.720 (1954); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.33 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.222 (1962);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.214 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.411 (1962), with Mich
Rev. Crim. Code §§ 4220, 4110-15, 4710 (Final Draft 1967).
90. For example, Mich. Comp. Laws § 800.283 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.1623 (1954) makes it a crime to introduce into any prison an implement which
may be used to injure or convict. No mention is made as to whether the actor must
intend to introduce the item or must even appreciate its capacities for misuse. In the
criminal code itself, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.483 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.751
(1954) makes it an offense to neglect or refuse to assist a police official, but does not
state whether the individual must know or recognize the person requiring assistance is
a police officer. Compare Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 299, § 479a, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.747(1) (Supp. 1968). Other provisions refer to the mental element at one point
and not at another. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.479 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.747
(1954) originally prohibits "knowingly and willfully" obstructing an officer serving a
warrant, but later simply makes a reference to any person "who resists" an officer
executing a local ordinance.
91. See People v. Damm, 183 Mich. 554, 149 N.W. 1002 (1914); People v.
Rice, 161 Mich. 657, 126 N.W. 981 (1910).
92. See, e.g., Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 236 (RIA), § 2513, Mich. Stat Ann.
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likely that this law is aimed only at those officers who realize they are
accepting illegal consideration. On the other hand, the absence of any
reference to a requisite mental element might indicate a legislative
intent to place upon the officer an absolute duty to determine proper
fees and accept no higher amount." Similar provisions in other areas
often do specify that the officer act "willfully" or "corruptly. '9 4 Yet
others do not-whether by reason or inadvertence again is unclear.,
The absence of any reference to mens rea still creates problems
of interpretation even where the statute involved clearly is not intended
to impose strict liability. Consider, for example, a provision prohibit-
ing obstruction of a state agricultural agent in the performance of his
duty."" The basic nature of this offense indicates that some mens rea is
required, but at exactly what level is uncertain. Must the actor intend
to obstruct the agent or is reckless disregard sufficient on this point?
Must he have knowledge that the person obstructed was indeed a
state official, or is recklessness in this regard also sufficient? Of
course, analogous statutes or common logic may provide satisfactory
answers, 97 but the legislature's oversight in failing to specify the requi-
site mens rea leaves the issue sufficiently open to foster otherwise need-
less litigation.
Unfortunately, the difficulties involved in defining mens rea have
hardly been reduced by most legislative attempts to specifically de-
scribe the required mental element. The terms most frequently used
in the current code to describe mens rea are "willfully" and "mali-
ciously."98 Apparently, neither has a "set" definition. What each term
§ 27A.2513 (1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.279 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.99
(1960); Mich. Comp. Laws § 701.18a (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3178(18a) (1962).
93. Compare Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 3225(3) (Final Draft 1967).
94. See, e.g., Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 236 (RJA), § 7611, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 27A.7611 (1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.214 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.411
(1962).
95. See Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 236 (RJA), § 2513, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 27A.2513 (1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.279 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.99
(1960); Mich. Comp. Laws § 701.18a (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3178(18a) (1962).
The legislature has been inconsistent in its use of mens rea terminology even in areas
where strict liability is often employed. Compare Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.23 (1948),
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.213 (1962), with Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.24 (1948), Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 28.214 (1962).
96. Mich. Comp. Laws § 286.7 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 12.137 (1967); also
Mich. Comp. Laws § 287.149 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 12.449 (1956).
97. Similar statutes dealing with other officials require that the defendant have
acted "knowingly" or "willfully." See Mich. Comp. Laws § 300.17 (1948), Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 13.1227 (1967); Mich. Comp. Laws § 409.26 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.726
(1960); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.241 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.438 (1962).
98. See, e.g., the various provisions in the following chapters of the current penal
code: Chapter X (arson); LXX (public offices and officers); LXXXV (trespass).
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requires seems to depend primarily on the specific statutory context
in which it arises, with very few guidelines for separating one context
from another. 9 In fact, judicial interpretation of both terms lends
further support to Justice Jackson's famous comment about the "vari-
ety, disparity and confusion of [judicial] definitions of the requisite
but elusive mental element."'0° Taken literally, the term "willfully,"
might suggest only that the individual acted consciously and volun-
tarily.1 1 The Michigan decisions, however, indicate that "willfully"
means considerably more. At least one opinion states that the actor
must have intended to cause the harm that resulted from his act.0 2
Yet, another seems to suggest that it is sufficient that he acted in
reckless disregard of potential harm. 03 Similarly, the term "mali-
ciously" literally should require that the actor had an evil or wicked
intent; 104 and, indeed, one opinion does state that it requires a "spirit
desiring harm or misfortune to another . . . .,105 Again, however,
another opinion seems to take a contrary view, suggesting that malice
might only require that the actor intended to do the act that proved
harmful. 00 Moreover, as applied in the homicide area, the require-
ment of malice has been further reduced to encompass even a reck-
less disregard of a "strong likelihood that ... harm will result."'01
The legislature's use of the terms "willfully" and "maliciously"
is even more confusing (and far less logical), especially where the
two terms have been used in combination. Closely related provisions
in the current code will sometimes use the terms conjunctively, some-
times alternatively, or sometimes as substitutes for each other, with-
out suggesting any rational patterns for the variation.' s For example,
99. Highway Comm'rs v. Ely, 54 Mich. 173, 19 N.W. 940 (1884). See United
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933); Remington & Helstad, The Mental Element
in Crime-A Legislative Problem, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 644, 666.
100. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
101. See Cal. Pen. Code § 7; W. Clark & W. Marshall, Law of Crimes § 5.07
(7th ed. M. Barnes 1967).
102. People v. Lee, 231 Mich. 607, 611-12, 204 N.W. 742, 744 (1925); accord,
Highway Comm'rs v. Ely, 54 Mich. 173, 178-80, 19 N.W. 940, 943-44 (1884).
103. People v. Orr, 243 Mich. 300, 308, 220 N.W. 777, 779 (1928).
104. V. Clark & V. Marshall, supra note 101, § 5.05.
105. See People v. Vanderpool, 2 Mich. N.P. 264, 267 (Cir. Ct. 1870); accord,
People v. Petheran, 64 Mich. 252, 265-66, 31 N.V. 188, 194 (1887).
106. People v. Tessmer, 171 Mich. 522, 528, 137 N.W. 214, 216 (1912). See also
People v. Comstock, 115 Mich. 305, 312, 73 N.W. 245, 248 (1897).
107. See People v. Hansen, 368 Mich. 344, 350, 118 N.XV.2d 422, 425 (1962).
108. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.72 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.267 (1962);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.74 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.269 (1962); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.75 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.270 (1962) (all relating to arson). See
also Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.108 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.303 (1962) (making
it a crime to "willfully remove any ship, boat, or vessel from their fastenings . . . or
1968]
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in the chapter on malicious destruction, the section on destroying
bridges prohibits "willfully and maliciously" breaking,10D that on
boundary markers prohibits "willfully or maliciously" breaking,
110
that on fences simply prohibits "maliciously" breaking,"' and that
on public utility equipment prohibits "willfully" breaking." 2 The sec-
tion on trees further complicates matters by prohibiting destruction
caused "willfully and maliciously, or wantonly and without cause.
M1 3
Moreover, "willfully" and "maliciously" are not the only terms treated
in this seemingly inconsistent manner. The legislature apparently has
had similar difficulties in determining the relationship between the terms
"knowingly" and "willfully." Section 220 of the present code speaks of
acting "knowingly and willfully" in filing a false report," 4 but section
199 speaks of acting "knowingly or willfully" in aiding an escapee."'
At the same time, one judicial decision suggests that the term "know-
ingly" may often be superfluous since the term "willful" sometimes
requires, by itself, that the actor have knowledge of all -material
facts." 6 Similar difficulties have also arisen from the occasional sub-
stitution of the term "intentionally" for "willfully" in a few current
provisions."
The Proposed Code, following the lead of revisions in other
states," 8 seeks to eliminate these difficulties by employing four uni-
• . . maliciously loose any ship, boat, or vessel . . . and suffer the same to float
away . .. ").
109. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.379 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.611 (1954).
110. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.383 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.615 (1954).
111. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.81 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.613 (1954).
112. Mich Comp. Laws § 750.383a (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.615(1> (1954).
113. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750382 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.614 (1954).
Cf. Mich. Pub. Acts 1965, No. 38, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.556 (Supp. 1968).
114. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.220 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.417 (1962).
See also Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.411a (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.643(1) (1954).
115. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.199 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.396 (1962).
116. See People v. Jewell, 138 Mich. 620, 101 N.W. 835 (1904), holding that
a statute similar to Mich. Pub. Acts 1964, No. 147, § 491, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.759
(Supp. 1968), prohibiting willful destruction of records, was not applicable where the
actor clearly intended to destroy the record but did not know he lacked legal authority
to do so.
117. Compare Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.413 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.645
(1954) (prohibiting "wilfully and' without authority" taking possession of another's
car), with Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.416 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.648 (1954)
(prohibiting "intentionally and without authority" starting another's car). See also
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.279 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.490 (1962).
The term "corruptly" is also used as a substitute for "willfully." See Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750332 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.564 (1954). It is also employed in con-
junction with "willfully." See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.191 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§, 28.388 (1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.214 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.411
(1962).
118. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 4-4 to 4-7 (1964); N.Y. Pen. Law § 19.05.
See also Remington & Helstad, supra note 99.
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form levels of mens rea that are used throughout. The terms used to
describe these levels are "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly" and
"negligently." Each is carefully defined, with a special effort made to
distinguish properly the concept of criminal negligence from ordinary
civil negligence. 19 Actually, these terms are all recognized in current
law and should not create any confusion. 20 The Proposed Code in-
cludes at least one of these terms in the definition of every offense
requiring mens rea, except those few in which the description of the
proscribed act necessarily encompasses a specific mental element.' 2 '
As a result, a mens rea requirement is clearly evidenced in all sections
that are not based upon strict liability. 2 2 This should eliminate any
confusion as to whether a particular offense falls in that limited
category.
2 3
The Proposed Code also should eliminate difficulties in determin-
ing the applicability of mens rea requirements to different elements
of a crime. When a provision refers to a single level of mens rea, that
level will apply to all material elements of the crime. 24 Thus, if a
provision states that the defendant must have acted "intentionally"
in causing specific harm to a particular subject, this would require
both an actual intent to cause the harm and knowledge of the identity
of the subject if that factor is also a material element of the offense.
Where intent applies to one element and recklessness to the other,
both terms are used. 25
The careful use of these standard terms throughout the Proposed
Code should be of particular help to the judge in charging a jury. Of
course, the proposed definitions of the basic levels of mens rea are
too broad and general to aid the jury in themselves, but the uniform
pattern of their use should give the courts considerable assistance in
interpreting a particular provision and developing a specific charge
119. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 305 (Final Draft 1967).
120. See People v. Hansen, 368 Mich. 344, 118 N.W.2d 422 (1962); People v.
Orr, 243 Mich. 300, 220 N.W. 777 (1928); People v. Tantenella, 212 Mich. 614, 180
N.W. 474 (1920).
121. See, e.g., Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 4605-07 (Final Draft 1967) (escape).
Of course, in the few cases where the standard levels are not appropriate, other terms
are used. Thus, the provision on receiving property describes the requisite mens rea as
"knowing" that the property was stolen or "believing that in all likelihood it has been
stolen." Id. § 3250. See also id. § 4040.
122. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 310, 315(2) (Final Draft 1967).
123. See, e.g., id. §§ 2725(1)(a), 3225 (imposing a form of strict liability).
124. Id. § 315(1), specifically provides that "[wihen one and only one of these
terms [of mens real appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply
to every element of the offense unless a legislative intent to limit its application clearly
appears."
125. See, e.g., id. § 2807.
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tying that provision to the facts of the particular case. 126 Hopefully,
this should lead both to greater jury understanding of the judge's
charge and to fewer legal disputes as to the meaning of mens rea.
The Proposed Code is also designed to eliminate several other
common sources of ambiguity in the current penal law. Thus, unlike
the current code, it contains a complete description of the basic activity
constituting each offense. Current provisions sometimes state that a
particular crime shall be punished as a felony or misdemeanor, but
never provide a description of the offense. 2 7 This is true, for example,
of the provision on assault and assault and battery. 2 Ordinarily, the
lack of a precise definition in this provision causes little concern be-
cause the terms "assault" and "battery" are so common as to be
almost self-defining. On occasion, however, potential assault cases do
not fit within the common view of the term. A bartender who slips a
"mickey" into the drink of. a customer has not engaged in a direct
and forceful touching.129 Nevertheless, his action should as clearly
qualify as a battery as a shooting or striking. 3 0 The Proposed Code,
by insisting on a complete definition, eliminates any doubt on this
matter. Section 2102 specifically states that a person commits the
crime of assault in the second degree if:
[f] or a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment,
he intentionally causes stupor . . . or other physical or mental im-
pairment . . . to another person by administering to him, without
his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing
the intended harm.' 31
Most of the current problems of interpretation, however, stem
126. Used in this fashion, the Proposed Code definitions should not present the
obstacles envisaged in Kuh, A Prosecutor Considers the Model Penal Code, 63 Colum.
L. Rev. 608, 621-23 (1963). Also, Mr. Kuh's complaint was leveled against the Model
Penal Code definitions of culpability which are considerably more complex than those
adopted in the Proposed Code. The Model Penal Code attempts to draw a distinction
between the person who has the conscious objective to produce a particular result and
one who is aware his conduct necessarily will cause that result, but does not desire it.
See Model Penal Code § 2.02, Comment (3) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The Proposed
Code does not draw this distinction, using the term "intentionally" to describe both
situations. This is in accord with the usual view of intent, i.e., a person "intends" those
'physical consequences that he knows will necessarily flow from his actions, even though
he may not desire them. See G. Williams, Criminal Law § 18 (2d ed. 1961).
127. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.158 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.355
(1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.321 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.553 (1954).
128. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.81 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.276 (1962).
129. For a discussion of the Michigan law on assault and battery see Tinkler v.
Richter, 295 Mich. 396, 295 N.W. 201 (1940); People v. Carlson, 160 Mich. 426, 125
N.W. 361 (1910).
130. Carr v. State, 135 Ind. 1, 34 N.E. 533 (1893); R. Perkins, Criminal Law
81-82 (1957).
131. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 2102(1)(e) (Final Draft 1967).
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from ambiguities in sections, unlike assault, in which the legislature
has attempted to describe specifically the particular offense. Section
479 of the current code is typical." 2 It is an extremely lengthy and
detailed provision prohibiting interference with officers in the per-
formance of specific duties. However, the proscribed conduct is merely
described as "obstruct [ing], resist [ing] or oppos [ing]" any officer. Al-
though the use of force is mentioned at one point, the section as a
whole does not clearly indicate whether affirmative physical force is
needed to obstruct, resist, or oppose an officer. Would an individual
violate this provision, for example, if he vigorously criticized and ver-
bally attacked an officer who was attempting to serve process on
another? Does a person resist arrest if, when placed under arrest and
ordered to walk to a police vehicle, he "goes limp" and forces the police
to carry him? Courts in other states have held that similar activities
constitute violations of obstruction or resistance provisions.- s The
historical background of section 479 as well as some early judicial
interpretations suggest that the section probably was not designed to
encompass such activity. 34 Nevertheless, the statutory language would
not bar a contrary ruling, and at least one local police authority has
argued that even an attempt by a person to flee from an arrest con-
stitutes resistance in violation of section 479.135 The Proposed Code
clearly settles the issue by requiring "physical interference" under
the general obstruction provision and the use of "physical force"
against the officer under the special provision on resisting arrest. 36
Similar steps are taken in defining other offenses to eliminate several
current ambiguities analogous to that in section 479.137
132. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.479 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.747 (1954).
133. See Note, Types of Activity Encompassed by the Offense of Obstructing a
Public Officer, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 388, 390-92 (1960) (discussing cases involving verbal
conduct). See also In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 51-55, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322, 332-34
(1966) (involving defendant who "went limp").
134. Section 479 is essentially the same as the original 1846 provision prohibiting
resistance of officers. See Mich. Rev. Stat. 1846, ch. 156, § 23. It seems unlikely that
that provision, in light of its context, was aimed at anything other than affirmative
physical obstruction or threats thereof. See, e.g., People v. Clements, 68 Mich. 655, 36
N.W. 792 (1888); People v. Jones, 1 Mich. N.P. 194 (Cir. Ct. 1871).
135. In fact, a prosecution based on this theory was initiated in Washtenaw
County a few years ago, but was later dropped. Several courts have found resistance
in flight situations. See Note, supra note 133, at 398-99.
136. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 4505, 4625 (Final Draft 1967).
137. Thus, Mich. Pub. Acts 1955, No. 264, § 197a, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.394(1)
(1962), prohibits escape from "lawful custody under any criminal process." The state
police have interpreted this provision as applicable to a person who escapes from a
police car after having been arrested. The ambiguity of the term "criminal process"
naturally makes this interpretation subject to question. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code
§§ 4601(2), 4607 (Final Draft 1967), are drafted so as to specificaliy include this situa-
196S]
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Another unnecessary source of ambiguity under the current code
is the practice of limiting definitions to the affirmative elements of an
offense, without any reference to special grounds that may excuse lia-
bility for that particular offense. For example, the current extortion
provision fails to consider whether an honest belief in liability excuses
a threat to accuse another of a crime unless reimbursement is made.
138
Similarly, the bribery provision does not consider whether extortion
is a defense to that crime, i.e., whether a person is criminally liable if
he makes an unlawful payment to a public servant, but only in re-
sponse to the threat of the public servant that he otherwise would
take action against that person.139 Whether such excuses would be
recognized under present law would depend ultimately upon a court's
interpretation of somewhat ambiguous statutory requirements that
the actor behave "maliciously" or "corruptly.1 14 0 The Proposed Code
prefers to avoid such needless uncertainty by providing a direct answer
to issues of this nature in the section defining the specific offense. 4
Of course, not every special "justification" that might offset a basic
element of a particular crime can be anticipated, but the Proposed
Code does attempt to deal with at least the most common, i.e., the
most frequently litigated, matters of this type.14
The process of resolving ambiguities in these and other areas
obviously involved more than simple drafting reforms. Various sub-
stantive policy decisions had to be made. In most instances, however,
the decisions were largely dictated by the basic function of the par-
tion. Those sections bar any escape from "custody" and define custody as "detention
by a public servant pursuant to an arrest."
Similarly, under the current provision prohibiting possession of burglar tools,
there is some question as to whether the actor must be shown to have intended to use
the tools himself. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.116 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.311
(1962). Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 2615 (Final Draft 1967), would dearly include the
supplier who possesses burglar tools for distribution to others.
138. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.213 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28A10 (1962).
Compare In re Sherin, 27 S.D. 232, 130 N.W. 761 (1911), and O'Neill v. State, 237
Wis. 391, 296 N.W. 96 (1941), with State v. Burns, 161 Wash. 362, 297 P. 212 (1931).
139. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.117 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.312 (1962).
People v. Ritholz, 359 Mich. 539, 103 N.W.2d 481 (1960), suggested that extortion
would constitute an excuse for making a bribery payment.
140. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.117 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.312 (1962),
requires that the actor "corruptiy" offer a bribe, and Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.213
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.410 (1962), requires that the threat be made "malidously."
As for the significance or insignificance of these terms see In re Sherin, 27 S.D. 232, 130
N.W. 761 (1911), and the cases cited therein.
141. Both "excuses" are accepted as valid. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 3247(2)
(Final Draft 1967) (extortion); id. § 4705(2) (bribery).
142. See, e.g., id. § 3310 (claim of right no defense to robbery); id. § 4930
(retraction under specified circumstances a defense to perjury); id. § 6135 (extrater-
ritorial origin no defense to lottery).
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ficular offense. 43 Thus, although there were no Michigan cases directly
on point, the Committee had no doubt that the definition of false
pretenses should include the failure to disclose an adverse claim on
property even when one makes no specific affirmative representation
as to marketability. 144 Similarly, the function of the "joy-riding" statute
fairly well determined the appropriate definition of "unauthorized
use" as applied to the bailee who makes personal use of the vehicle
contrary to a bailment agreement. A strict interpretation making the
statute applicable to every employee who used a company car for a
personal side trip obviously would go far beyond the type of "joy-
riding" that led to the adoption of the statute. Accordingly, unautho-
rized use was limited to "gross deviations" from the bailment agree-
ment, such as the using of the company car for a month-long personal
trip to California.1 41 Not surprisingly, this type of analysis has not
only served to eliminate ambiguities, but it also has encouraged the
general utilization of definitions that should give the courts a much
clearer indication of the basic thrust of each offense.
Abolition of Common Law Crimes. The Committee's efforts in
improving the definitions of current statutory offenses generally have
been well received. Some concern has been expressed, however, over
the decision to abolish common law offenses. 46 That decision was
143. In some instances, case law clearly indicated the appropriate resolution. See,
e.g., People v. Ritholz, 359 Mich. 539, 103 N.W.2d 481 (1960). In at least one case,
however, the Committee resolved an ambiguity contrary to the leanings of Michigan
precedent. The general mens rea standard for perjury throughout the United States
requires only that the actor did not believe that his false statement was true, i.e., he
can either know his statement was false or testify in reckless disregard as to whether it
is true or false. See 3 F. Wharton, Criminal Law § 1291, at 1308 (R. Anderson ed.
1957). A few states expressly require knowledge or belief that the statement was false,
and two older cases indirectly suggest that Michigan follows this approach. People v.
Mankin, 225 Mich. 246, 196 N.W. 426 (1923); Smith v. Hubbell, 142 Mich.
637, 648-49, 106 N.W. 547, 551 (1906). Neither court faced the issue directly, but
only mentioned the point in passing. The Committee concluded that the majority rule
was more consistent with the general standards for mens rea. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code
§ 4905 (Final Draft 1967). The minority rule was premised on the misconception that
the majority rule would not protect a person who swears to the truth of a matter when
he is not absolutely certain it is true. However, since the majority rule only requires
"good faith belief," not absolute certainty, such a person clearly would not have the
requisite mens rea under the majority rule.
144. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 3201(a) (iv) (Final Draft 1967); People v. Etzler,
292 Mich. 489, 290 N.W. 879 (1940) ; People v. Lee, 259 Mich. 355, 243 N.W. 227 (1932);
cf. People v. Vida, 2 Mich. App. 409, 140 N.W.2d 559 (1966).
145. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 3230 (Final Draft 1967); id. § 3235, Comment.
146. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.505 (1948), Mich Stat. Ann. § 28.773 (1954)
provides for the punishment of "any indictable offense at the common law." However,
most of the common law offenses have been preempted by statutory provisions. See
generally Pettinger v. People, 20 Mich. 336 (1870); Drennan v. People, 10 Mich. 169
(1862).
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based on the premise that the combined objectives of fair warning
and efficient administration require that each crime be statutorily de-
fined.' 47 Some attorneys have argued for retention of the common law
of crimes, however, on the ground that if the Proposed Code should
fail through oversight or otherwise to reach an obvious evil, the courts
could always rely upon their common law power to declare that evil
a crime. This contention is based, I believe, on a misconception of
the judiciary's ability to expand the scope of common law crimes. 4
Any attempt to use the common law as a regular device for filling
unintended loopholes in criminal legislation would raise serious con-
stitutional problems. 49 Vagueness objections to the common law devel-
opment of crimes have been overcome primarily because such crimes
traditionally include only well established, previously defined of-
fenses. 150 In fact, prosecutions based on the common law in this state
and others have been limited to only a few, clearly identified offenses-
largely inchoate crimes (e.g., conspiracy and solicitation) and offenses
against public administration (e.g., coercion of witnesses and harbor-
ing fugitives)."'
The Proposed Code replaces the traditional common law offenses
with a series of separate statutory provisions. 52 These provisions not
only cover the same ground as the common law crimes, 153 but very
147. See 47 Colum. L. Rev. 1332 (1947).
148. See Brumbaugh, A New Criminal Code for Maryland?, 23 Md. L. Rev. 1,
31-34 (1963).
149. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); 47 Colum. L. Rev. 1332,
1335-37 (1947).
150. See J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 52-53 (2d ed. 1960). But see
Commonwealth v. Mochan, 177 Pa. Super. 454, 110 A.2d 788 (1955).
151. See, e.g., People v. Ormsby, 310 Mich. 291, 17 N.W.2d 187 (1945); People
v. Tenerowicz, 266 Mich. 276, 253 N.W. 296 (1934); People v. Hammond, 132 Mich.
422, 93 N.W. 1084 (1903). See generally 47 Colum. L. Rev. 1332 (1947). In 1966,
the Michigan Legislature adopted a general statutory provision on conspiracy. Mich.
Pub. Acts 1966, No. 296, § 157a, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.354(1) (Supp. 1968). However,
this provision utilizes the common law definition of a punishable conspiracy, and only
adds new penalties.
152. See, e.g., Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 4505 (obstructing governmental opera-
tions), 5010 (bribe receiving by a witness), 5045 (tampering with physical evidence)
(Final Draft 1967).
153. See id. § 5010, Comment. In a few areas, the Proposed Code provisions modify
the scope of the common law offense. For example, § 1010 extends criminal liability to
the solicitation of misdemeanors as well as felonies. The common law of solicitation
was generally thought to extend only to solicitations of felonies and "aggravated" mis-
demeanors, i.e., those misdemeanors relating to obstruction of justice and breach of
the peace. See Model Penal Code § 5.02, Comment (2) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960);
W. Clark & W. Marshall, Law of Crimes § 4.04 (7th ed. M. Barnes 1967). Michigan
cases dealing with solicitation have only involved solicitation of felonies. See, e.g.,
People v. Hammond, 132 Mich. 422, 93 N.W. 1084 (1903). However, several specific
provisions dealing with solicitation reach activities that would constitute misdemeanors
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frequently clear up uncertainties as to the scope of these offenses. For
example, as defined at common law, riot required the combination of
only three or more people engaging in tumultuous and violent con-
duct." While Michigan never adopted a substantive provision specifi-
cally prohibiting riots, it did adopt a special Riot Act governing the
use of force to dispel riots."' This Act raises the minimum number of
rioters to twelve persons armed or thirty unarmed. 5 Whether these
minimums modify the substantive common law offense is unclear. In
fact, an argument might even be made that the Riot Act, in effect, en-
tirely supersedes the common law offense."' The Proposed Code elimi-
nates the current confusion on this point. Section 5510 makes riot a
separate offense, defined essentially as at common law except that the
minimum number is set at five persons rather than three."" Other provi-
sions, most notably sections 4560-61 and 4635-37 restating accessory-
after-the-fact liability, eliminate similar ambiguities in other common
law areas.5 9 Accordingly, the various provisions replacing the com-
mon law offenses, taken together, should serve the ends of criminal
law in a much better fashion than their predecessors. Certainly, ex-
perience in other states indicates that they will do no worse.6 0
Restatement of General Principles. In one sense, the Proposed
under the Proposed Code. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.338 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.570 (1954); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.425 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.667 (1954).
Accordingly proposed § 1010 was extended to include solicitation of all offenses with
the punishment correlated to the seriousness of the offense solicited (e.g., solicitation
of a misdemeanor would itself constitute only a lesser grade misdemeanor).
154. R. Perkins, supra note 130, at 346.
155. Mich. Comp. Laws 8§ 750.521-.528 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.789-.796
(1954).
156. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.521 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.789 (1954).
157. See generally 1 G. Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure § 4
(2d ed. 1953); 4 id. § 2206.
158. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 5510 (Final Draft 1967).
159. See id. §§ 4560-61, 4635-37, Comments. Sections 4560-61 deal with the acces-
sorial liability of the person who assists in disposing of the proceeds of an already
completed offense. Since such a person would not necessarily have the purpose of
hindering the apprehension of the original felon, there is some question as to whether
he could properly be classified as an accessory after the fact. See Model Penal Code
§ 208.32, Comment (7) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). But see Skelly v. United States, 76
F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1935).
160. See generally Brumbaugh, supra note 148; Smith, How Louisiana Prepared
and Adopted a Criminal Code, 41 J. Crim. L. & C. 125, 135 (1950); 47 Colum. L. Rev.
1332 (1947). The common law of crimes has long been abolished in numerous states
including California and New York. See id. at 1332 & nn.1 & 2, collecting a list of
these states. Common law offenses were more recently abolished in both Illinois and
Wisconsin as a part of their general code revisions. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 1-3
(Smith-Hurd 1964); Wis. Stat. § 939.10 (1958). As previously noted, experience with
the new codes in these states has been very good. See Keeton & Reid, Proposed Revision
of the Texas Penal Code, 45 Texas L. Rev. 339, 405 n.24, 407 (1967).
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Code also seeks to "replace" the common law in its restatement of
the so-called "general principles" of the criminal law. Our current
penal law is largely hybrid in form; the legislature provides the basic
definitions of individual offenses in the penal code, but the judiciary
formulates basic doctrines that limit the general applicability of the
code provisions. These doctrines, dealing with concepts such as mis-
take, duress and mental responsibility, automatically qualify the
scope of every offense although mentioned in the definition of none.
Rather than rely solely on judicial development of these principles,
the Proposed Code includes them within its basic statutory frame-
work. Part I of the Proposed Code defines all of the general defenses
to criminal liability-necessity, duress, entrapment, mistake, etc.-as
well as the general justifications for the use of force.161 It also estab-
lishes the standards for determining liability as an accessory and lia-
bility for inchoate crimes (i.e., attempt, solicitation and conspiracy).12
Though it follows a pattern employed in several other states,0 3 Part
I clearly constitutes an innovation for Michigan. The Committee
felt, however, that inclusion of the general principles in the criminal
code was necessary for several reasons.
First, just as with the substantive definitions, the general prin-
ciples should be viewed as an integrated part of a total body of law.
Because courts deal with bits and pieces of the total substantive law,
they lack an adequate vantage point from which to take that view.
Case law development, with its emphasis on the specifics of -the indi-
vidual case, does not readily avail itself to the integration of the
various common threads of the criminal law. Courts have had, for
example, too much difficulty attempting to relate the various justifi-
cations for the use of force-defense of property or person, prevent-
ing crime and making an arrest 4 -- to even consider the relationship
of rules developed in this area to the general treatment of mistake
and mens rea in the law.0 5 If the general principles are to be properly
161. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code chs. 3 (culpability), 6 (justification), 7 (responsi-
bility) (Final Draft 1967).
162. See id. chs. 4 & 10.
163. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, fits. I-II (Smith-Hurd 1964); N.Y. Pen.
Law pt. I. Other penal codes, like California's, have long included many general princi-
ples, although such provisions are not as comprehensive as those in the more modem
revisions. See Cal. Pen. Code §§ 20-22, 26-33, 197, 692-94.
164. Compare, e.g., People v. Shaffran, 243 Mich. 527, 220 N.W. 716 (1928)
(limiting the use of force to protect property), with People v. McGrandy, 9 Mich. App.
187, 156 N.W.2d 48 (1967) (holding one spouse could use deadly force to repel an
attack by the other even though retreat was available). See also Model Penal Code
§ 3.07, Comment (2) at 57 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
165. See Model Penal Code § 3.09, Comment () at 76-77 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1958).
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placed within the total comprehensive scheme of the criminal law,
they must be drafted as a single package.16 Thus, for much the same
reason that the legislature is the primary body in formulating the
definitions of specific offenses, it also must be the primary source in
formulating the general principles limiting those definitions.
Second, various issues concerning general principles are too im-
portant to remain unsettled, yet are unlikely to be resolved by judicial
decision, at least not in the near future. General doctrines that have
rarely been the subject of litigation nevertheless may have a signifi-
cant impact upon a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute or to re-
duce a given charge. For example, the concept of necessity-justifying
the commission of what would otherwise constitute an offense when
absolutely necessary to prevent a greater evil-is well recognized in the
practical operation of the law, even though there are no Michigan
cases on point. The criminal liability of an individual who, in an emer-
gency, forcibly restrains a person infected with a highly contagious
disease, or destroys the property of another to prevent a flood, is
rarely questioned.16 7 The Proposed Code's formal recognition of the
necessity justification'68 would furnish the prosecutor with appropriate
legal support for his decision not to prosecute in such cases. On the
other hand, a clear-cut statement that impossibility is not a defense
to a 'charge of attempt or conspiracy might support more vigorous
enforcement in other cases more appropriate for prosecution. While
the few relevant Michigan decisions clearly lean in the direction of
rejecting impossibility as a defense, the issue is hardly settled, espe-
cially as it relates to so-called "legal impossibility." 1 9 A prosecutor
knows he must be prepared for appellate litigation if he seeks to
charge a "fence" with attempted receipt of stolen property in a case
where the goods were accepted as stolen property, but cannot be shown
in fact to have been stolen. The same holds true for a charge of bribery
against a person who, in a case of mistaken identities, sought to bribe
166. See Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097,
1107-08 (1952).
167. Cf. Mich. Pub. Acts 1963, No. 17, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 14.563 (Supp. 1968)
(exempting physicians and nurses from liability for emergency care rendered in good
faith and without "grossly negligent or willful and wanton conduct").
168. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 605 (Final Draft 1967). See also id. § 610.
169. In People v. Jones, 46 Mich. 441, 9 N.W. 486 (1881), the court rejected an
alleged impossibility defense where the defendant had picked an empty pocket. See
also People v. Hirschfield, 271 Mich. 20, 25-26, 260 N.W. 106, 107-08 (1935). However,
courts have tended to distinguish between such cases of "factual impossibility" and
so-called "legal" or "inherent" impossibility. See, e.g., People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 496,
78 N.E. 169 (1906); Booth v. State, 398 P.2d 863 (Okla. Crim. 1964); Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 312 Pa. 140, 167 A. 344 (1933) ; R. Perkins, supra note 130, at 492-94.
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a private citizen under the belief that he was a public official. Yet,
impossibility quite clearly should not be a bar to prosecution in either
case. In each the individual has indicated both his willingness and
ability to engage in criminal acts, and fortuity should no more shield
him from criminal liability than the person who fires a pistol at another
and misses.170 The restatement of general principles in Part I would
eliminate any uncertainty on this point and on several others that have
much more practical significance than many of the issues settled in
the restatement of individual substantive offenses.
171
Finally, Part I also offers several minor advantages that should
assist in providing a more efficient administration of the criminal law.
The collection of general principles in a single place would provide
lawyers with a ready checklist in preparing their cases. It should also
encourage counsel's recognition of the interrelationship of the various
principles . 2 Additionally, Part I would provide an effective starting
point for intensive research on particular doctrines, in much the same
way as the definitional sections provide a starting point for research
on individual crimes. In particular, it should permit a more orderly
analysis Of current case law, which will, of course, be a primary author-
ity in construing the various principles restated in Part 1.173
Admittedly, some of these advantages may be offset by the intri-
cacy of several of the provisions in Part I. Simplicity of expression and
structure are sharply limited by the complexity of the subject. The
definition of an offense like "escape from custody" can be simply
stated, but a statement of the various grounds justifying the use of
170. See Model Penal Code § 5.01, Comment at 30-38 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
171. See, e.g., Mich. Rev. Crim. Code, § 415(b) (Final Draft 1967) (accomplice
liability of persons knowingly facilitating criminal activity through the distribution
of supplies, etc.); id. § 430 (criminal liability of corporations); id. § 1010(3) (relation
of voluntary renunciation to liability for an attempt); id. § 1015(3) (renunciation and
conspiracy liability).
172. Consider, for example, the potential impact of this approach on People v.
Marshall, 362 Mich. 170, 106 N.W.2d 842 (1961). The court there refused to impose
accessorial liability upon a person who knowingly lent his car to a drunk driver who
subsequently caused a fatal accident. The owner's liability was rejected on the ground
that he had not purposely aided the driver. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 415 (Final
Draft 1967). No attempt was made to view the owner's liability in terms of the Proposed
Code's § 410, dealing with an individual's responsibility for the acts of an innocent
agent. Under this approach, liability might well have been established on the ground
that the act of lending the car to the drunk driver was itself the proximate cause of
the accident.
-173. Of course, in a few areas, changes have been made that will render prior
decisions obsolete. Ordinarily, however, the provisions in Part I of the Proposed Code
merely restate generally accepted common law principles, and older Michigan cases,
where available, will be particularly relevant as a basis for interpretation. See Brum-
baugh, supra note 148, at 25.
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force in defense of the person cannot. The subject is just too complex
to be effectively delineated without the use of three or four subsections
with several paragraphs in each.'7 4 Yet, even though such a complex
provision may appear confusing at first glance, it should not be diffi-
cult to apply. Ordinarily, the provisions will not be applied in toto
since only one or two subsections will relate to the particular facts
of the case. Moreover, the provisions will not replace the individual
judge's own formulation of relevant principles, but only serve as an
initial source in the construction of his charge to the jury. 5 Employed
in this manner, similar provisions have proved valuable in other states.
Eliminating Loopholes. Another basic objective of the Proposed
Code is to fill the various loopholes in the current law. In using the
term "loopholes," I refer only to those gaps in the coverage of the
penal law that are clearly inconsistent with policies expressed in cur-
rent code provisions. These gaps stem from several sources. Some are
simply a product of legislative oversight in drafting the current provi-
sions. For example, our present bribery provisions generally prohibit
both acceptance or solicitation of a bribe.78 The provision prohibiting
bribery of jurors, however, refers only to acceptance of a bribe.'
Similarly, while one existing statute7 8 prohibits offering a bribe to a
person elected to office but not yet seated, another statute' 79 appears
to prohibit receipt of bribes only by persons presently in office. The
Proposed Code eliminates various inconsistencies of this type.8 0 More-
over, by utilizing a standard format in drafting related provisions, it
should help to avoid such oversights in the future.
Many of the loopholes in the current law can be traced to legis-
174. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 615 (Final Draft 1967).
175. See Wechsler, Foreword to Symposium on the Model Penal Code, 63 Colum.
L. Rev. 589, 590-91 (1963).
176. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.214 (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 2S.319 (1962); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.125 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.320 (1962).
177. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.120 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.315 (1962).
178. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.117 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.312 (1962).
179. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.118 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.313 (1962).
Compare Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 5030 (Final Draft 1967).
180. Compare, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.306 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.538
(1954) (prohibiting possession of pool tickets), with Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.373
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.605 (1954) (prohibiting possession of lottery tickets only
if held with intent to sell); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.375 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.607 (1954) (making it a crime to print lottery tickets), with Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.305 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.537 (1954) (making it a crime to publish
gambling odds, but not pool tickets or policy sheets); Mich. Pub. Acts 1964, No. 147,
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.759 (Supp. 1968) (prohibiting carrying away or mutilating, but
not falsifying, public records), with Mich. Comp. Laws § 326.20 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 14.241 (1956) (prohibiting falsification of certain records). See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code
§§ 4555, 6115 (Final Draft 1967).
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lative attempts to meet new developments with narrow, piecemeal
amendments directed at specific fact situations. For example, in 1964,
the legislature amended the disorderly conduct statutes in order to
reach harassing telephone calls. The new provision designates as dis-
orderly, any person who "telephones ... any other person and uses...
any vulgar, indecent, obscene, threatening or offensive language .... M81
The legislature obviously concentrated solely on the particular type
of harassing call that had been the source of current complaints and
did not consider other forms of telephone calls that might be equally
disturbing. As a result, the present code would not reach such prac-
tices as calling a person several times in the middle of the night and
simply "hanging up" as he answers. A similar legislative pattern is
revealed in a 1942 provision prohibiting false reports of crime to the
police. 8 ' This provision covers persons who report entirely fictitious
crimes, but not those who furnish fictitious information about an actual
crime. Neither does it reach the mischief maker who calls the police
to investigate a fictitious emergency other than a crime, such as an
alleged drowning or serious fall. Again, by concentrating on only one
aspect of a general problem, the legislature failed to reach equally dis-
ruptive conduct of a similar nature. The Proposed Code, by describing
offenses in terms of their general elements, has effectively plugged
several gaps in coverage of this type.
183
The Proposed Code's more functionally related definitions should
also eliminate those loopholes that stem from the current use of sepa-
rate provisions to regulate the same basic activity as applied to
different subjects. For example, while a special provisions bars the
smuggling of alcohol, narcotics or a dangerous item into a prison,184
only a much more limited section, requiring an intent to assist an es-
cape, applies to mental hospitals.'85 Similarly, the present code makes
it a crime to possess plates for counterfeiting money or commercial
notes, but fails to deal with possession of plates for counterfeiting
other items that the individual could not lawfully reproduce (e.g.,
state liquor stamps)."" Such distinctions are largely unintended by-
181. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.167 (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.364
(Supp. 1968). Compare Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 5535 (Final Draft 1967).
182. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.411a (1948); as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.643(1) (Supp. 1968). Compare Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4540 (Final Draft 1967).
183. See, e.g., Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4525, Comment at 338 (Final Draft
1967); id. § 7020, Comment at 498-99.
184. Mich. Comp. Laws § 800.281 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1621 (1954);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 800.283 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1623 (1954).
185. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.198 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28395 (1962).
186. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.255, .262, .264 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.452,
.459, .475 (1962).
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products of ad hoc legislation and were easily eliminated through
expansion and consolidation of the current provisions.187 In other
situations, however, the distinctions were tied to the nature of the
actor's position and presented a stronger basis for differential treat-
ment. For example, a current provision applicable only to legislators
prohibits them from receiving compensation for personal services
rendered in connection with any contract or claim on which they later
are to exercise discretionary authority. 88 Although many other public
officials are restricted by conflict of interest laws, not all would be sub-
ject to the same prohibition as the legislator. 9 While one could argue
that the legislator's special position justifies holding him to a higher
standard of responsibility, the Committee felt that the basic act pro-
hibited by this legislation often constituted a disguised form of bribery
and should be applicable to all employees, as is the bribery provision. 9 '
Similarly, the Committee saw no reason to limit to unmarried women
the current provision prohibiting concealment of the death of a new-
born child."' Whether the infant was illegitimate or not has no rele-
vance for the purposes of this statute, which is designed to deal with
possible homicide situations. 92
In several instances, unnecessary distinctions creating loopholes
in the law have been the product of outmoded judicial doctrines rather
than legislative oversight. Perjury is probably the most notorious ex-
ample of an offense made ineffective by technical common law doc-
trines that have no relation to the basic function of the offense. 93 In
fact, the President's Commission's major recommendation in the area
of substantive law reform concerned the elimination of technical
restrictions on perjury prosecutions. 94 Most of these restrictions re-
late to special requirements for the proof of perjury, and the Proposed
Code has either eliminated or modified these restrictions in line with
the recommendations of the President's Commission, the Commis-
187. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 4020, 4615-16 (Final Draft 1967).
.183. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.411b (1948), Mich. Sta. Ann. § 28.643(2) (1954).
189. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4720, Comment at 378-79 (Final Draft 1967)
(collecting the various conflict of interest provisions).
190. See id. § 4715, Comment at 377-78. See also id. § 4810, Comment at 387 (ex-
tending the provisions prohibiting misuse of confidential information to all govern-
ment empl6yees).
191. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.150 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.347 (1962).
192. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 7025, Comment at 500 (Final Draft 1967). Cf. id.
§ 7050, Comment at 507.
193. See Model Act on Perjury, Prefatory Note (1952); A Report by the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society 141 (1967) [hereinafter cited as President's Commission].
194. President's Commission at 141.
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sioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute. 95
However, the Proposed Code also attacks technical doctrines that
impose needless substantive limits on the perjury offense. For exam-
ple, under present law, a notarized statement would not be treated as
such if the notary testifies that, notwithstanding his jurat, he probably
had not properly administered the oath. 9 In view of the prevalent
looseness of notarial practices, this possibility exists in many cases. 97
As a result, a defendant who knowingly submits a notarized false affi-
davit or deposition with full intention of having it treated as a sworn
statement may nevertheless escape perjury liability simply because he
selected, perhaps intentionally, a negligent notary. The Proposed
Code's perjury provision closes this escape hatch by providing, in
effect, that a notarized statement will be taken as made under proper
oath, irrespective of the notary's subsequent disclaimer, if the declarant
intentionally represents it as such. 98 Along the same lines, the Pro-
posed Code also rejects several other technical objections to perjury
prosecutions that have no relation to the basic criminality of the false
swearing (e.g., that the defendant's false testimony was inadmissible
under the rules of evidence).1 9 Of course, with perjury so frequently
a product of unrealistic substantive law (e.g., the tort rule on contribu-
tory negligence), discarding these technical restrictions is not likely to
have a major impact on its prevalence.2 0 Nevertheless, combined with
other changes, elimination of these loopholes should restore the effec-
195. The recommendations concerned the special corroboration or "two witness"
rule and the direct evidence standard of proof. The Proposed Code eliminates the direct
evidence concept by permitting the prosecutor to establish falsehood by introducing two
contradictory sworn statements without proving which in fact was false. See Mich. Rev.
Crim. Code § 4915 (Final Draft 1967). This follows the recommendations of: President's
Commission at 141; Model Act on Perjury § 2 (1952); Model Penal Code § 241.1(5)
(Official Draft 1962). The Proposed Code did not totally discard the special corroboration
requirements of the "two witness" rule, but it did eliminate those aspects of the rule
generally viewed as unnecessarily restrictive. Proposed § 4920 permits the normal rules
of evidence to govern proof of perjury except that "falsity ...may not be established
solely through contradiction by the testimony of a single witness." For an explanation
of this limitation see Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4920, Comment at 402 (Final Draft
1967).
196. The jurat is only "presumptive evidence" that the oath was properly ad-
ministered. Mich. Comp. Laws § 55.113 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 5.1047 (1961). See
Johnson v. Van Velsor, 43 Mich. 208, 5 N.W. 265 (1880).
197. See Proposed N.Y. Pen. Law § 215.40, Staff Comment at 375-76 (Study Draft
1964) (discussing the New York experience).
198. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4901(3) (Final Draft 1967). See also State ex rel.
Marachowsky v. Kerl, 258 Wis. 309, 45 N.W.2d 668 (1951).
199. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4925, Comment at 406 (Final Draft 1967).
200. See generally Hibschman, "You Do Solemnly Swear!" or That Perjury
Problem, 24 J. Crim. L. & C. 901 (1934). The Proposed Code also adopts a lenient
retraction provision that provides a valuable aid in encouraging corrections of sworn
mistatements. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4930 (Final Draft 1967).
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tiveness of perjury prosecutions in certain limited areas, including
those in which perjury penalties play an especially important role in
implementing immunity statutes.
20 1
The Proposed Code's effort to eliminate loopholes is also likely to
have some practical impact in the important area of commercial
crimes. In particular, several changes in the formulation of the basic
theft offense should afford greater protection against commercial
fraud. 02 Under present law, for example, obtaining property through
a false statement as to a future event will not constitute false pretenses,
although it may be larceny by trick.2 3 Liability thus will depend upon
whether the actor received title to the property or only possession." 4
The Proposed Code rejects this distinction, making misrepresentation
by future promise a basis for liability in either case. 05 A "tout" at a
race track who converts money received from another under a false
pretense that he will bet it on behalf of that person will now be liable
irrespective of whether he technically can be classified as a bailee. 00
The crucial factor will be the fraudulent use of deception, rather than
the type of property interest acquired through that deception.
A somewhat similar approach is employed to strike a serious loop-
hole in the current treatment of misappropriation of restricted funds.
Under the present provisions, embezzlement liability extends only to
such funds as the actor actually received in trust from another.0 7
Thus, an employer would not be liable for misappropriation of funds
deducted from an employee's wages under a union dues check-off plan.
He would be liable, however, if he directly paid the employee's entire
201. The President's Commission report particularly stressed the significance of
perjury prosecutions in supporting the effective use of immunity statutes. President's
Commission at 141.
For illustrations of other areas in which technical loopholes are eliminated see Mich.
Rev. Crim. Code § 1015, Comment at 101-02, 3215 (Final Draft 1967); Id. § 3215,
Comment at 232.
202. Although not normally viewed as a serious crime problem, business frauds
account for considerably greater economic losses than robbery, burglary and larceny
combined. See President's Commission at 32-34.
203. See People v. Widmayer, 265 Mich. 547, 251 N.W. 540 (1933); People v.
Martin, 116 Mich. 446, 74 N.W. 653 (1898). See generally Pearce, Theft by False
Promises, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 967 (1953).
204. People v. Niver, 7 Mich. App. 652, 152 N.W.2d 714 (1967); People v. Martin,
116 Mich. 446, 74 N.W. 653 (1898). See also Pearce, supra note 203.
205. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 3201(a)(v), 3205(1)(c) (Final Draft 1967).
To insure these provisions will not be misused by application to an ordinary debtor-
creditor situation, § 3205(2) provides that deception cannot be shown simply by "failure
to perform standing alone . . . ." See also People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d
271 (1954).
206. Cf. People v. Martin, 116 Mich. 446, 74 N.W. 653 (1898), holding a defendant
liable in a somewhat similar situation on the ground that she was a bailee.
207. See, e.g., People v. Gregg, 170 Mich. 168, 135 N.W. 970 (1912).
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wages, and the employee had then returned the actual funds held by
the employer to pay the union. 08 This distinction is purely artificial.
The crucial factor should be whether the employer recognized a clear
duty to make specified disposition of the particular funds, irrespective
of their original source. The Proposed Code would base liability on
exactly that factor. 09
The Proposed Code also includes several changes that would reach
other, more direct patterns of commercial crime. As previously noted,
the scope of the general theft provision is expanded to include mis-
appropriation of all types of commercial services.2 10 Similarly, the
extortion provision is expanded to include a broader range of threats
used in blackmailing. The present extortion provision applies only to
threats to either "accuse another of a crime.., or... threaten injury
to the person or property or mother, father, husband, wife or child of
another .... ,,211 The Proposed Code extends the class of proscribed
threats to include those made against persons other than the victim
and his close relatives.2'2 A threat to injure a fiance, child of a friend
or an employee may be just as effective in extorting money as a threat
against a spouse. The Proposed Code also includes threats to engage
in other illegal acts (e.g., denial of a legal right) or to expose a secret
that will subject another to community contempt. These threats may
not be as dangerous as those presently covered, and they are, in fact,
categorized as involving a lower level offense.213 Nevertheless, they
still constitute a form of blackmail and should be treated as such.
In almost every case in which the Proposed Code expands the
scope of present provisions, the Committee's aim was to eliminate
serious, existing loopholes, such as those found in the area of com-
mercial crime. In a few instances, however, statutes were broadened
primarily in anticipation of future changes that might make current
provisions inadequate. For example, as the number of sundry govern-
mental forms continuously increases, it seems obvious that the require-
ment that these forms be made under oath will have to be discarded.
208. Model Penal Code § 206.4, Comment at 80-81 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). See
also Commonwealth v. Mitchneck, 130 Pa. Super. 433, 198 A. 463 (1938).
209. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 3226-27, Comments at 236-37 (Final Draft
1967). Compare Mich. Comp. Laws § 207.118a (1948>, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 7.308(1)
(1960), with People v. Wadsworth, 63 Mich. 500, 30 N.W. 99 (1886).
210. See p. 775, & notes 19 & 20 supra; Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 3220 (Final Draft
1967). See also Comment, The Michigan Revised Criminal Code and Offenses Involving
Theft, 14 Wayne L. Rev. p. 969 infra.
211. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.213 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.410 (1962). See
People v. Watson, 307 Mich. 378;, 11 N.W.2d 926 (1943).
212. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 3245 (Final Draft 1967).
213. Id. § 3247.
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In most cases, however, the information sought will still be of suffi-
cient significance to require criminal penalties for material falsifica-
tions. Accordingly, under section 4906 (perjury in the second degree),
a statement is treated as equivalent to having been made under oath
if it is "made on or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by
law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable.,
2 14
The function of the oath requirement basically is to -put the individual
on notice of the special significance of the information required; the
special formality of the oath serves to evidence the seriousness of the
state's demand for honesty, and forewarns the actor that falsification
will bear special sanctions.2 15 Experience with the federal income tax
forms indicates that printed notices, if presented in appropriate form,
can adequately serve this function. Accordingly, section 4901(3) would
permit the substitution of such forms for an oath, but only where
specifically authorized by the legislature.1 6 The anticipation of similar
changes in other areas led to slight expansion of several current pro-
visions.1 7 In each instance, however, the expansion was carefully
limited so as not to be subject to abusive application under current
circumstances.
In examining potential loopholes in the present law, the Commit-
tee occasionally came across problem areas that were probably covered
by current provisions, but only in a rather indirect fashion. In several
instances, these areas were considered of sufficient importance to create
entirely "new" provisions aimed at the specific evils involved. One
provision of this type is section 4505, prohibiting the intentional physi-
cal obstruction of any governmental activity. Physical obstruction of
a governmental activity usually will involve a violation of the criminal
trespass statutes.18 Many obstructions that might not fall under the
ambit of such statutes, such as locking an administrator out of his
office, would constitute criminal tampering under section 2712.19 Still
214. See id. § 4901(3) (a).
215. The oath requirement originally had a theological basis, see Silving, The Oath,
68 Yale L.J. 1329 (1959). Its justification Itoday, however, must be based strictly on
functional grounds. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
216. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4901(3) (Final Draft 1967); id. § 4906, Comment
at 391-92.
217. See, e.g., Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 2720 (Final Draft 1967) (extending
prohibition against noxious substances to materials other than valerium); id. § 4620
(extending bail jumping to persons released from custody without bond).
218. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); cf. People v. Weinberg, 6 Mich.
App. 345, 149 N.W.2d 248 (1967).
219. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 2712(1) (a) (Final Draft 1967) makes it a Class B
misdemeanor to "[tiamper with the property of another person with intent to cause
substantial inconvenience to that person or to another." The door-locking case would
clearly come within this provision, see id. § 2710(a) (defining "tamper"). Such- activity
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other obstructions would involve disorderly conduct. In each instance,
however, the relevant provision gives no weight to the fact that gov-
ernmental activities are being impaired. There is presently a series
of statutes that do emphasize that factor, but prohibit obstruction
only of certain officers (e.g., conservation officers, dairy inspectors
and firemen).22' The Committee agreed with the premise of these
statutes, that intentional interference with general governmental ser-
vices adds a dimension to otherwise unlawful conduct that justifies
its separate treatment. Accordingly, section 4505 expands upon these
provisions to protect all lawful governmental functions from inten-
tional physical interference. 22
This type of analysis also led to the expansion of the right of the
law officer to disperse unlawful assemblies. Present law authorizes
dispersement only of any "riotous" group.222 Section 5520 would also
include persons participating in illegal non-violent conduct that causes
"serious inconvenience" to the public.223 Of course, since the underly-
ing activity must be illegal, the officer would always have the right to
arrest these participants. The Committee believed, however, that he
should also have an independent authority to disperse the crowd where
he does not desire to rely on his arrest authority. Moreover, if the
participants refuse to disperse, the prosecutor can proceed under
section 5520 which appropriately emphasizes the serious inconvenience
caused by the participants' activities rather than just the technical
violation of property rights involved in a simple trespass charge. Hereagain, the "new" crime does not really extend the coverage of the
might not constitute a trespass because the individuals involved may not have been
"forbidden" to "enter upon" the government property. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.552
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.820(1) (1954). Similarly, it would not constitute malicious
destruction because no physical damage results. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.330
(1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.612 (1954).
220. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 289.40 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 12.836 (1967)
(dairy inspectors); Mich. Comp. Laws § 300.17 (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 13.1227 (1967) (resisting a conservation officer); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.241 (194S),
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.438 (1962) (firemen).
221. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4505, Comment at 325-26 (Final Draft 1967).
222. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.521 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.789 (1954),
refers to any group "unlawfully, riotously or tumultuously assembled . . . ." Despite
its reference to those "unlawfully" assembled, this provision probably would not be
applicable to a group of persons peacefully participating in an unlawful demonstration
(e.g., a sit-in). The Michigan provision is patterned after the English Riot Act of
1714 and would be limited to conduct that at least threatens violence. See R. Perkins,
Criminal Law 348-49 (1957). Cf. People v. Dixon, 188 Mich. 307, 154 N.W. 1 (1915)
(refusing to apply § 750.521 to a group unlawfully assembled to see a movie on Sunday).
223. Like the riot provisions, § 5520 also requires an assemblage of 5 or more per-
sons. It also applies to illegal assemblies that cause "substantial harm or serious . . .
annoyance or alarm . . . ." Mich. Rev. Crin.- Code § 5520(1) (Final Draft 1967).
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present law, but merely seeks to deal directly with a particular type
of evil that is only reached indirectly under present provisions. With
only a few exceptions, most of the apparently "new" offenses under
the Proposed Code actually fall into this category.224
Restricting Overbreadth. Just as the Committee found it neces-
sary to broaden some provisions in order to plug loopholes, it also found
it necessary to restrict others in order to prevent potentially pernicious
and unnecessary "overbreadth." A statute was viewed as overbroad
only when its coverage encompassed activities substantially beyond
that which it was designed to punish. In most instances, the over-
breadth stemmed from the literal application of the statute to con-
duct widely recognized by society as morally innocent. Of course,
statutes so broadly drafted are rarely enforced to the fullest extent.
But this factor neither renders them harmless nor justifies their reten-
tion. The appropriate restraint shown by prosecutors generally cannot
be attributed to all prosecutors under all circumstances; and, even if it
could, leaving such a basic determination as to the scope of the penal
law entirely in the prosecutor's discretion is fundamentally inconsistent
with the basic premises of codification.2 Moreover, the very presence
224. Typical of the "new crimes" in this category is Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 2322
(Final Draft 1967). Section 2322 creates the crime of subjecting another to sexual contact
less than rape without that person's consent. Where a minor is involved, such abuse is
usually classified as indecent liberties. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.336 (1948), as
amended, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.568 (1954). The sexual abuse of an adult, however,
is merely treated as a form of assault. While it clearly does fit within the definition of
assault, the crucial aspect of the act relates to its sexual motivation. Section 2322 properly
emphasizes this factor.
It should also be noted that § 2322 applies only where the actor believed under
all circumstances that his victim did not consent. It does not prohibit the normal
advance of the "nothing ventured, nothing gained" variety. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code
§§ 2320-22, Comment (Final Draft 1967). As with the indecent liberties provision, proper
emphasis upon this requisite mental element will prevent misapplication. Compare People
v. Noyes, 328 Mich. 207, 43 N.W.2d 331 (1950), with People v. Healy, 265 Mich. 317,
251 N.V. 393 (1933).
225. This is not to suggest that administrative discretion will not play a large
part in limiting the Proposed Code's provisions to their proper function. A code that
encompasses only such cases as we intend to make criminal, and clearly excludes all
others, is beyond the skill of legislative draftsmen. See President's Commission at 130.
However, it is one thing to seek a fair degree of precision in statutory definitions and
rely on administrative discretion to round off the rough edges, and quite another to
assign the basic task of draftsmanship itself to administrative discretion. See generally
LaFave, Penal Code Revision: Considering the Problems and Practices of the Police,
45 Texas L. Rev. 434 (1967). The Committee did not attempt to draw lines too finely.
It is often possible to visualize some hypothetical situation that might technically violate
a code provision, yet would not generally be viewed as involving a criminal act. Yet
where 99% of the cases covered by a provision are likely to be appropriate situations
for imposing penal sanctions and 1% are not, it is usually best to cover the entire area,
leaving the 10 to the common sense of police and prosecutors in fashioning enforce-
ment policy, rather than attempt to carve that 17 out of the statutory framework.
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of such broadsweeping provisions on the statute books may in itself
place a needless burden on local police. The police ordinarily have no
desire to enforce such provisions to the letter of the law. They are
fully aware, for example, that most of the public accept the friendly
poker game at the local Elks Club and that a midnight raid will
hardly enhance their working relationship with the community. Yet,
they cannot readily undermine their image as the agency responsible
"only for enforcing the law, not judging it." This image imposes a
continuing pressure for full enforcement that makes it difficult for the
police to simply refuse to. respond when such clearly illegal action is
called to their attention by an insistent complainant.20  Thus, the
Proposed Code's elimination of unnecessary overbreadth should serve
both to promote more equal enforcement of the law and to facilitate
more efficient police administration.
Much of the overbreadth in current provisions results from techni-
cal defects in legislative drafting. For example, the prohibition against
"fortune telling for gain" fails to exclude fortune telling performed as
part of a theatre or nightclub act.21 7 The statute making it a crime for
a- citizen to refuse a police request for assistance in apprehending a
fugitive fails to except the person who, because of a weak heart or
other circumstances, is clearly justified in refusing the request. 28 And
the statute providing for the registration of found property fails to
separate clearly its requirements from those minimum steps needed to
exempt from criminal liability a finder who- eventually converts the
found property to his own use.22 '9 Defects such as these were easily
What the Committee was concerned with in the area of overbreadth was statutes that
covered large areas that clearly were not appropriate for penal sanctions and could
easily be excluded from the statutory coverage.
226. See Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 Pub. Admin.
Rev. 140 (1963); La Fave, supra note 225, at 436-39.
227. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.267-.268 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.478-.479
(1962). Compare Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4225(2) (Final Draft 1967).
228. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.483 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.751 (1954). Com-
pare Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4520 (Final Draft 1967). The current provision is overly
broad in one other respect. As written, it permits a police official to request assistance
in the general "execution of his office, in any criminal case." Taken literally this would
permit an officer to demand assistance in searching a house, unloading a truck filled with
contraband, etc. Police officials on the Committee stressed that there was no need for
such broad power, and that its use in such situations would be contrary to acceptable
standards for police administration. Accordingly, § 4520 is limited to requests for assis-
tance in "[e]ffectuating or securing an arrest" or "[p]reventing the commission by
another of any offense." Id.
229. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 434.1-.12 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 18.701-.712
(1957). See People v. Harmon, 217 Mich. 11, 185 N.W. 679 (1921). Most people are un-
aware of this statute, and could easily take reasonable steps to discover and notify the
owner without complying with its specific provisions. The Proposed Code requires only
that the finder take "reasonable measures to discover and notify the owner" but does
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remedied through the adoption of comparatively minor statutory
changes.
230
The possible overbreadth in other provisions, however, raised far
more difficult issues and often required a careful reconsideration of
the basic objective of each provision.2 ' The current provision on in-
decent exposure is so broadly stated that it has been applied to mem-
bers of a secluded nudist colony.23 2 Obviously, this goes beyond the
basic statutory objective. A nudist camp is hardly a public place nor
are the people there likely to be affronted by nudity.233 But should the
statute even apply in every instance where these factors are present?
Should it apply, for example, to a drunk who attempts to urinate in
a well-lighted alley knowing that pedestrians might walk by at any
moment? The Committee concluded that in most instances it should
not. The statute should emphasize mens rea as well as the disturbance
of others, and primary application should be in the case of true exhibi-
tionism.1 4 Accordingly, the Proposed Code limits indecent exposure to
the public exposure of genitals with the intent to arouse or gratify
sexual desire.2 35 Some question has been raised concerning the prose-
not limit the definition of "reasonable measures" to compliance with the "finders" statute.
See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 3215 (Final Draft 1967). The Committee also recommended
that the "finders" statute "be revised to take account of the special coverage of the
matter in the Criminal Code itself." Id. § 3215, Comment at 233.
230. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 3215, 4225(2), 4520 (Final Draft 1967). See
notes 225-27 supra. For illustrations of similar defects cured by the Proposed Code,
see id. § 3260, Comment (scope of presumption arising from possession of machinery
with manufacturer's serial number defaced or removed); id. § 4040, Comment at 277
(scope of requisite mens rea for negotiating worthless checks); id. § 5730, Comment
(scope of provision prohibiting advertisements for the sale of firearms).
231. In addition to the indecent exposure provision previously discussed, see
Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 3230-35, Comment at 241 (Final Draft 1967) (limiting the
applicability of the joy-riding provision to riders who knew that the vehicle was stolen
at the time of entry) ; id. § 4705, Comment at 373-74 (limiting the bribery provisions to
the solicitation or offer of "pecuniary benefits").
232. Mich. Pub. Acts 1952, No. 73, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.567(1) (1954). See
People v. Ring, 267 Mich. 657, 255 N.W. 373 (1934). In a later case, People v. Hilda-
bridle, 353 Mich. 562, 92 N.W.2d 6 (1958), the court divided evenly on the nudism
issue, casting serious doubt on the continuing validity of the Ring case. See Comment,
Sex Offenses and Penal Code Revision in Michigan, 14 Wayne L. Rev. p. 934 infra at 963.
233. Compare People v. DeVine, 271 Mich. 635, 261 N.W. 101 (1935), with People
v. Hildabridle, 353 Mich. 562, 572-73, 92 N.W.2d 6, 10 (1958).
234. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 2325, Comment (Final Draft 1967).
235. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 2325 (Final Draft 1967). A somewhat similar ap-
proach was taken in the provision prohibiting the public display of indecent material.
Id. § 6320. This provision would prohibit public display of photographs and statues
revealing genitals or pubic areas when "presented in such a manner as to exploit lust."
Thus, it clearly would not be applicable to works of art. Compare Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.38 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.227 (1962) (making it a crime to display "any
representation of the human form in an attitude or dress which would be indecent in the
case of a living person . . . .
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cutor's ability to show such mens rea, but the Committee was informed
that this is an easy enough task in the case of the repeating offender,
and that is primarily where the statute is employed.
Significant limitations upon statutory overbreadth are also sug-
gested in the area of gambling offenses. Present provisions absolutely
prohibit all gambling.'O While there was considerable dispute as to
whether anti-gambling provisions were properly aimed at such events
as church-sponsored bingo, it was generally agreed that such statutes
clearly were not aimed at true social gambling, i.e., unsponsored gam-
bling for which there is no direct or indirect charge. The literal appli-
cation of current provisions to such gambling only serves to hinder
proper enforcement of the gambling statutes.2 3 7 Accordingly, the Pro-
posed Code, following the pattern of the Model Anti-Gambling Act,28
specifically excludes "social games of chance" in which each partici-
pant competes on equal terms.
2 39
The gambling provisions also except the participant in nonsocial
gambling who is merely a player, i.e., one who does not promote or ad-
vance the gambling in any way other than merely by betting.24 ° This
exemption is based in part on recognition that gambling is an exceed-
ingly widespread and accepted activity, and that the criminal law
therefore must be directed at those who exploit the popular urge to
gamble.241 More significantly, the exemption of bettors should make
their testimony more readily available to prosecutors since the exemp-
tion will bar bettor reliance on self-incrimination as a ground for refus-
ing to testify. 42 The Committee's treatment of bettors might seem,
236. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.301 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.533 (1954)
(prohibiting acceptance of money or other valuable thing with payment contingent on
a certain event); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.314 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.546
(1954) (making it an offense to win money at cards, dice, or any other game) ; Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.315 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.547 (1954) (making it a misde-
meanor to pay a gambling debt and not sue to recover the payment within 3 months).
237.. 2 ABA Comm. on Organized Crime, Organized Crime and Law Enforce-
ment 74 (1953). The Model Act proposes this exemption as an optional provision. See
also id. at 75.
238. See LaFave, supra note 225, at 436-38.
239. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 6101(h), 6105-06 (Final Draft 1967). A similar
position is taken in the provision barring the distribution of pornographic material to
adults (but not children). Id. § 6305(1). Compare id. § 6310.
240. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 6101(h), 6105-06 (Final Draft 1967).
241. Id. § 6106, Comment at 465.
242. Id. See also In re Vickers, 371 Mich. 114, 123 N.W.2d 253 (1963). Compare the
position taken in the provision on compounding. The Committee there rejected a
special exemption for the victim of a crime who agrees to drop prosecution if the
alleged offender restores property belonging to the victim or pays damages for the harm
the victim suffered. Although such persons are rarely prosecuted, the threat of prosecu-
tion is sometimes used to prevent the victim from "backing out" of the prosecution after
he has recovered reimbursement. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4530, Comment at 339-40
(Final Draft 1967).
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however, to conflict with its treatment of the individual who patronizes
a prostitute. In this area, the Proposed Code provision probably ex-
pands upon present coverage in holding the patron as well as the
prostitute criminally liable.243 Arguably, the moral turpitude of one
who patronizes a prostitute is no greater than the patron of a bookie.244
However, the patron of a prostitute is far more likely to become a vic-
tim of a crime, often one of violence.2 45 The presence of criminal
liability might serve as some deterrence in keeping prospective patrons
away from high crime areas in which prostitution flourishes. In any
event, it will afford the police sufficient authority to exercise their arrest
powdr in the interest of protecting the patron as well as the general
community. This function was formerly served by a provision pro-
hibiting loitering in houses of prostitution,24 6 but changes in the opera-
tion patterns of prostitutes have made that section far less effective.
247
In both situations discussed above-gambling and indecent ex-
posure-it is quite clear that the current provisions are overbroad,
although views may vary as to the degree of overbreadth. This is true
in most instances in which the Proposed Code restricts current cover-
age,248 but not all. In the area of offenses against privacy, for example,
the broad scope of a recently adopted statute posed considerable diffi-
culty in determining the intended function of current anti-eavesdrop-
ping provisions. That statute, adopted in 1967, makes it a felony to
243. See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 6205 (Final Draft 1967). Under current law, the
male technically could be held under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.448 (1948), Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 28.703 (1954), if he originally solicited the prostitute, or under Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.167 (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.364 (Supp. 1968), if found
loitering in a house of prostitution. But see People v. Brandt, 306 P.2d 1069 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1956) ; People v. Anonymous, 161 Misc. 379, 292 N.Y.S. 282 (Magis. Ct. 1936),
suggesting that a single visit to a house of prostitution is not a sufficient basis for a
loitering conviction.
244. In large part, this depends upon whether one views the prostitute as the
"victim" of the offense. See George, Legal, Medical and Psychiatric Considerations in the
Control of Prostitution, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 717, 744-53 (1962).
245. Although separate statistics were not available, law enforcement officials
suggested that it is not unusual for a substantial percentage of the robbery victims in
Detroit on any given weekend night to be either customers or prospective customers of
prostitutes. See generally American Bar Foundation, Law Enforcement in the Metrop-
olis 85, 89 (D. McIntyre, Jr. ed. 1967).
246. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.167 (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.364 (Supp. 1968) (classifying as disorderly persons "any person found loitering
in a house of ill-fame or prostitution or place where prostitution or lewdness is prac-
ticed, encouraged or allowed").
247. See American Bar Foundation, supra note 245, at 86: "Full fledged brothels,
as such, were rare. Instead, the prostitutes solicited their trade on the street and escorted
their patrons to rooms in their own homes or in nearby accommodations which they
rented."
248. See, e.g., Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 2807, Comment at 215 (Final Draft 1967)
(limiting the arson provisions as applied to a person who burns his own property);
id. § 7005, Comment (rendering the incest provision inapplicable to cousins, etc.).
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"overhear, record, amplify or transmit" any private conversation
without the consent of both parties to the conversation.2 4 9 Ordinarily,
anti-eavesdropping statutes, such as the federal and state wiretap
prohibitions, permit eavesdropping with the consent of either party 501
This protects the citizen's right to make some record of his conversa-
tion with the aid of a secret listener. It is not unusual, for example,
for an employer to ask his secretary to "listen in" secretly on a con-
versation with a client. Of course, to some, such activity constitutes
a basic invasion of privacy. 51 The legislature's failure to modify the
Michigan wiretap provision (requiring the consent of only one party)
indicates, however, that the 1967 statute was not based on this broad
view of privacy. 5 2 The Committee accordingly treated the enlarged
application of the 1967 provision as a legislative oversight and recom-
mended that eavesdropping as well as wiretapping be permitted where
one party consents.253
The Committee's efforts to eliminate overbreadth were also made
more difficult by the inherent vagueness of several overly broad pro-
visions. 54 For example, provisions making it a crime to be a "vagrant"
or a "person who engages in an illegal occupation" establish highly
ambiguous status offenses of doubtful constitutionality. 25 Yet, the
vagueness of such provisions is almost essential if they are expected
to serve as primary authority for police efforts to control suspicious
249. Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 319, §§ 539a(2), 539e, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.807
(1)-(2), .807(5) (Supp. 1968).
250. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.540 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.803 (1954).
See also Rathbon v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); People v. Marinian, 359 Mich.
361, 102 N.W.2d 568 (1960).
251. See Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping & Eavesdropping:
Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 63 Colum.
L. Rev. 189, 208-09, 214-21 (1968) (listing the various objections to the consent ex-
emption). See also People v. Kurth, 34 Ill. 2d 387, 216 N.E.2d 154 (1966).
252. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.540 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.808 (1954).
See also People v. Marinian, 359 Mich. 361, 102 N.W.2d 568 (1960).
253. If, on the other hand, the Committee's view of the policy expressed in the
1967 eavesdropping bill is incorrect, then the wiretapping statute should be amended to
require the consent of both parties. Compare Cal. Pen. Code §§ 631(a), 632(a) (Supp.
1967).
254. Of course, a certain degree of vagueness was found to be inherent in some
legislation. For example, a provision seeking to insure so broad an objective as the proper
upbringing of a child must, of necessity, be somewhat vague. The Proposed Code provi-
sion on endangering the welfare of a child simply prohibits knowing action "likely to
be injurious to the physical or mental welfare of a child under 17." Mich. Rev. Crim.
Code § 7040 (Final Draft 1967).
255. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.167 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.364 (1962).
On the constitutionality of such provisions, see Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229
N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967); Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 362 (1953)
(dissenting opinion; the majority did not reach the merits).
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persons through "investigative arrests," or "on-the-street stops" and
interrogation 58 The Committee recognized this factor, but concluded
that the validity of such police activities should be faced directly in
specific legislation on police authority rather than through manipula-
tion of the substantive law.2" Accordingly, the various status offenses
were replaced by provisions prohibiting specific acts, such as prostitu-
tion, loitering and disorderly conduct..
A somewhat similar approach was taken in defining criminal con-
spiracy. Our current provision prohibits conspiracies to either commit
"an[y] offense prohibited by law, or to commit a legal action in an
illegal manner. '250 Under this definition, any agreement to perform a
tortious or otherwise wrongful act carries the potential of being pun-
ished as a criminal conspiracy. 0° Admittedly, judicial interpretation has
somewhat narrowed the literal scope of the offense by insisting that
the wrongful act be sufficiently far-reaching to have "a harmful effect
on society and the public."' ' Nevertheless, the offense remains largely
"open-ended" and subject to serious constitutional objections. In fact,
a somewhat similar provision has been held-unconstitutional in two
256. See LaFave, supra note 225, at 451-54 & nn.77-78; Kadish, Legal Norm and
Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 904, 912-13 (1962).
See also American Bar Foundation, supra note 245, at 78-80, 84-86.
257. See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. Pa.. L. Rev.
603, 649 (1956).
258. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 5520, 5540, 5545, 6201 (Final Draft 1967). Of course,
a certain degree of vagueness is also inherent in some of these provisions. The definition
of disorderly conduct, for example, specifies particular acts (e.g., fighting,. using
obscene language in a public place, obstructing traffic, etc.) but also includes a ejusdem
generis clause prohibiting any activity that "creates a hazardous or physically offensive
condition by any act that serves no legitimate purpose." Mich. Rev. Crim. Code
§ 5525(1)(g) (Final Draft 1967). To some degree, the vagueness of this provision is
offset by the requirement that the actor at least be aware of a substantial likelihood that
his acts will cause "public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm." Cf. Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Nevertheless, such standards as "legitimate purpose" and
"public . . . annoyance or alarm" hardly meet the usual standards of precision. They
may be necessary, however, if the provision is to adequately cover the great variety of
acts that are commonly viewed as disorderly conduct. E.g., Commonwealth v.
Wysocki, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 334 (1954) (firecrackers on highway); State v. Duvall, 140
Kan. 456, 36 P.2d 958 (1934) (defendant had herself bound and left on a public high-
way). See also Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 5540(1)(e) (Final Draft 1967), defining
loitering as "remain[ingj in or about a school building or grounds, not having any
reason or relationship involving custody of or responsibility for a pupil or any other
specific, legitimate reason for being there . .. ."
259. Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 296, § 157a, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.354(1) (Supp.
1968).
260. See People v. Tenerowicz, 266 Mich. 276, 253 N.W. 296 (1934); State v.
Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 9 A.2d 63 (1939). See generally Pollack, Common Law Con-
spiracy, 35 Geo. L.J. 328 (1947).
261. People v. Tenerowicz, 266 Mich. 276, 283-84, 253 N.W. 296, 299 (1934);
see Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 250 Ky. 343, 63 S.W.2d 3 (1933).
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states and its validity questioned by the United States Supreme
Court.262 The Committee preferred to avoid such objections by restrict-
ing the general conspiracy provision in the Proposed Code to con-
spiracies to commit criminal acts. At the same time, however, it ac-
knowledged that
behavior that the law [generally] does not regard as sufficiently
undesirable to punish criminally when pursued individually may
nevertheless be so immoral, oppressive to individual rights or preju-
dicial to the public as to necessitate criminal liability when pursued
by a group.
263
Accordingly, it recommended that "such [behavior] should be dealt
with by special conspiracy provisions in the legislation governing the
class of conduct in question. ' 264 These separate provisions would in-
clude such legislation as the recent proposal to proscribe conspiracies
to charge extravagantly usurious interest rates on loans (i.e., "loan
sharking") .265
The Committee's effort to eliminate unnecessary vagueness is
also reflected in the treatment of conflicts of interest by public offi-
cials. Several current provisions make it a crime for specified public
servants to be "directly or indirectly interested in any contract,
purchase, or sale" by the public institution which they serve. ' As
numerous opinions of the attorney general illustrate, what constitutes
an "indirect interest" in a contract or sale is not easily determined.
26T
The complexity of this issue was recently recognized by the legislature
in adopting a new civil conflict of interest provision that establishes a
special procedure for obtaining advisory opinions on potential conflict
situations.6 ' The Committee believed that "the remedy afforded by
that law, namely, making the contract subject to being voided by the
state agency plus possible non-criminal disciplinary action provided
by other provisions, e.g., removal from office . . . should be entirely
262. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948); State v. Bowling, 5 Ariz. App. 436, 427
P.2d 928 (1967) ; State v. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193 (1950), all dealing with
a provision prohibiting conspiracies "injurious to public morals."
263. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 1015, Comment at 98 (Final Draft 1967).
264. Id.
265. Proposal made by the Organized Crime Division of the Attorney General's
Office. See Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 250 Ky. 343, 63 S.W.2d 3 (1933), for a dis-
cussion at common law.
266. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.122 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.317 (1962); see,
e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 45.82 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 5.1152 (1961); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 88.16 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 5.1712 (1949).
"267. See, e.g., E1967-68] Mich. Att'y Gen. Biennial Rep. No. 4555; [1955-56] Mich.
Att'y Gen. Biennial Rep. pt. 1, at 593; [19191 Mich. Att'y Gen. Annual Rep. 173.
268. Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 317, § 4, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 4.1700(4) (Supp.
1968).
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satisfactory in most cases."2 6 9 Rather than discard criminal sanctions
entirely, however, it developed easily ascertainable standards that
would permit application of those sanctions to complement the civil
legislation where needed. The Proposed Code's conflict of interest pro-
vision, section 4720, defines the applicable standard as the exercise
of discretionary authority in connection with a transaction involving
a firm in which the actor possesses an ownership interest or holds
an executive office.2 7 0 Moreover, rather than determining whether such
an interest completely bars the individual's participation, section 4720
merely imposes a duty upon him to disclose his interest. In this way,
it should encourage use of the advisory opinion procedure available
under the civil act, while still imposing criminal sanctions in those
few cases where the official attempts to hide his interest in order to
cover his misuse of authority.
Although the functional analysis employed by the Committee in
reducing vagueness and overbreadth was applied primarily to the
definitions of offenses, it was also responsible for the reformulation of
other material. For example, it led to recognition of mistake of law
as a valid defense where defendant acted in reliance upon an attorney
general's opinion or court decision that, at the time, upheld the legality
of his behavior. 7 1 Normally, of course, a person is not relieved of
liability because he acted under a mistaken belief that his behavior
was not criminal.2 2 The justifications for this rule are varied, and
rest on several separate premises.2 7 3 None, however, are appropriate
where the defendant relied on an official legal opinion, only to have
it subsequently overruled as applied to his case. 4 Such a defendant
clearly has made every effort to determine and abide by the law, his
reliance is patently reasonable, and the official nature of the opinion
reduces difficulties in proving reliance. In fact, under a recent Supreme
Court decision, exemption from liability in such a situation may even
be constitutionally required.
275
269. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4720, Comment at 379 (Final Draft 1967).
270. Id. § 4720(2). This definition is based upon the standard employed in
Mich. Pub. Acts 1966, No. 317, § 3(a), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 4.1700(3)(a) (Supp. 1968).
271. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 325(2) (Final Draft 1967).
272. See J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 376-92 (2d ed. 1960); R.
Perkins, Criminal Law 807-12 (1957). Of course, this is not true where an actor's mistaken
belief negates mens rea. See J. Hall, supra, at 392-401.
273. See Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949); J. Hall, supra note 272,
at 378-87.
274. J. Hall, supra note 272, at 389-92, Model Penal Code § 2.04, Comment 3 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955). See People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P.2d 965 (1933);
State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 156 So. 705 (1934). But see United
States v. One Hundred Barrels of Vinegar, 188 F. 471 (D. Minn. 1911).
275. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US. 559 (1965). In Cox, the Court reversed a con-
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Most of the proposed substantive changes discussed so far are
rather limited in scope."' More significantly, they are all based on
policies that the Committee found to be presently incorporated in our
criminal law. There are a few areas, however, in which the Committee
has recommended either outright abandonment or very significant
modifications of present policy. These are: (1) the abolition of
criminal sanctions for adultery, private consensual homosexual activity
among adults and illicit cohabitation; (2) the expansion of the
grounds for legalized abortion; (3) the recognition of mistake as to
the female's age as a defense to statutory rape; (4) the adoption of a
somewhat broader definition of legal insanity; and (5) the imposition
of new restrictions on the use of force in effecting or resisting an
arrest. 77 Although each of these changes is discussed at length in
the symposium comments that follow, I would like to add a few
comments here. For while I agree with much of what is said in those
viction under an admittedly constitutional statute prohibiting picketing "near" a court-
house on the ground that the defendants had been told "in effect" by the city's highest
police officer that their demonstration "would not be one 'near' the courthouse within
the terms of the statute." Id. at 571.
276. The exact degree of change is often difficult to determine. Many "changes"
adopted by the Proposed Code probably reflect the same position that the Michigan
courts would take if forced to consider that "change." For example, the Proposed Code
provision on provocation judges the reasonableness of the actor's behavior "from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be." See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 2005(2) (Final Draft 1967). While this
might depart from the common law in many states, see Model Penal Code § 201.3,
Comment (5) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), the Michigan Supreme Court has already taken
a more flexible view of provocation than most courts. See Maher v. People, 10 Mich.
212 (1862). Similarly, the new provision on reckless endangerment, Mich. Rev. Crim.
Code § 2115 (Final Draft 1967), encompasses activities that constitute assaults in
those states which recognize a "reckless" assault. However, the Michigan courts have
not faced this issue, though dicta indicate an intent to injure would be necessary for
an assault. See People v. Doud, 223 Mich. 120, 193 N.W. 884 (1923); People v.
Sheffield, 105 Mich. 117, 63 N.W. 65 (1895). But cf. Mich. Pub. Acts 1952, No. 45,
§ 1, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.436(21) (1962).
277. At points, one or two articles in the symposium seem to suggest that the
Proposed Code contains other basic changes. I believe, however, that most of the
changes mentioned, e.g., the consolidation and expansion of the theft provision, properly
reflect an implementation of present policy. See pp. 809-10 supra. Others, e.g., the alleged
change in the requirement of retreat prior to the employment of deadly force, are not
likely to be viewed as changes at all when more recent cases are taken into considera-
tion. See, e.g., People v. McGrandy, 9 Mich. App. 187, 156 N.W.2d 48 (1967).
One basic change not mentioned above is the employment of an affirmative defense
in the area of felony murder. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 2005(4) (Final Draft 1967).
Ordinarily, however, the Proposed Code follows the traditional Michigan practice of
imposing the burden of proof for all elements on the prosecution, although the defense
may have the duty to inject certain issues. See id. § 135(n).
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Comments, I have found certain areas of disagreement and a few
others to which some supplementary points might be added.
The proposed abolition of the offense of adultery is probably the
most controversial of the basic changes suggested by the Committee.
Unfortunately, much of the controversy stems from a misunderstand-
ing of the Committee's reasons for proposing this change. The Com-
mittee's recommendation quite clearly is not based on the premise
that adultery is a proper or even harmless activity.2 78 Rather, it is
grounded exclusively on difficulties created by the generally non-
enforceable nature of the offense. Full or even fairly comprehensive
enforcement of our adultery provision is a practical impossibility,
both in terms of the manpower it would take and the police techniques
of surveillance and entrapment that would be needed.2 79 Some have
argued, however, that the adultery provision, even though not en-
forced, does make an important contribution to the moral climate of
society. The criminal prohibition, in their view, reinforces community
ideals in providing a basic standard for the training of youth and the
setting of personal goals of conduct. They also feel that repeal of our
current, long standing provision would be particularly damaging be-
cause it might be viewed as official acceptance of adultery as an
"inevitable evil. 280
Members of the Committee offered two grounds for rejecting this
position. First, many disagreed with the basic premise that the current
criminal provision reinforces our moral standards and that its repeal
would undermine these standards. They noted that attitudes toward
adultery and fornication are not noticeably different in those states
that lack provisions punishing one or the other.281 Nor have attitudes
278. Model Penal Code § 207.1, Comment at 208-09 (Tent- Draft No. 4, 1955)
(potential threat of adultery to the family relationship). Some authorities have argued
that adultery is productive of "no 'public mischief' or demonstrable impairment to the
individuals concerned." Cohen, Reflections on the Revision of the Texas Penal Code,
45 Texas L. Rev. 413, 423 (1967). See generally Schwartz, Moral Offenses and the Model
Penal Code, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1963).
279. The Kinsey studies indicate that a substantial percentage of married males
and females commit at least one adulterous act during marriage. See A. Kinsey, W.
Pomeroy & C. Martin, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male 585-89 (1948); A. Kinsey,
W. Pomeroy, C. Martin & P. Gebhard, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female 416
(1953). On difficulties that would be presented by a policy of full enforcement, see
Cohen, supra note 278, at 423-25; Note, Post-Kinsey: Voluntary Sex Relations as
Criminal Offenses, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 162 (1949).
280. See generally Remington and Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legisla-
tive Process, 1960 U. Ill. LYF. 481, 493-94 (1960); Cohen, supra note 278, at 423 & n.37.
281. See A. Kinsey, W. Pomeroy & C. Martin, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male
334-86, 583-84 (1948) (discussing the factors influencing attitudes towards various
sexual activities). A dozen states do not prohibit private fornication under any circum-
stances. Only 20 punish a single act of intercourse. Note, supra note 279, at 166; Model
1968]
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changed in Illinois as a result of repeal of the prohibition against
private consensual sodomy in that state's 1961 code revision." 2
Criminal laws recognized by the community as totally unenforced
simply do not establish morality. On the contrary, they tend to under-
mine respect for the penal law generally. Second, many members ex-
pressed concern over the potential for improper and discriminatory
enforcement of the current adultery provision.2 3 Complaints are
generally filed either to secure a favorable divorce settlement or to
force a spouse to return "home." In either instance, they place the
prosecutor in a situation that is often personally distasteful as well as
disrespectful of the criminal process.
Quite similar arguments were advanced in favor of eliminating
current provisions prohibiting illicit cohabitation and private homo-
sexual activity between consenting adults.28 4 The emphasis was pri-
marily upon difficulties created by enforcement rather than the moral
quality of the acts involved.28 5 In the area of homosexuality, moreover,
the relation of that activity to mental illness furnished an additional
ground for not imposing criminal sanctions.28 6 It should be emphasized
that neither proposal is new. Several states do not prohibit illicit
Penal Code § 207.1, Comment at 204-06 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Two states do
not punish adultery, Louisiana and Tennessee, and six others punish it only if open,
notorious and habitual. See Note, supra note 279, at 165 n.18, 166.
282. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 11-2 to 11-3, & Comments (Smith-Hurd 1964). Al-
though no scientific sampling was taken, reports from Illinois indicated that the restric-
tion of the Illinois provisions on deviate sexual behavior has caused little concern.
283. See generally Remington & Rosenblum, supra note 280, at 493-94; Model
Penal Code § 207.1, Comment at 205-06 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
284. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.335 (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 28.567 (1954) (illicit cohabitation); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.338-.338a (1948), as
amended, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.570-.570(1) (1954) (consensual homosexual activity);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.58 (1948), as amended, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.355 (1962)
(sodomy).
285. The difficulties involved in enforcing sanctions against private, consensual
homosexuality are discussed in Comment, Sex Offenses and Penal Code Revision in
Michigan, 14 Wayne L. Rev. p. 934 infra at 956-57. It should be emphasized that the
Committee was not opposed to the enforcement of morality through criminal sanctions
where basic interests were involved and the sanctions could be effectively enforced. See
Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 6310 (Final Draft 1967) ("Promoting Lascivious Materials for
Minors").
286. rE]fforts to cope with homosexuality by criminal prosecutions are incon-
sistent both with medical experience and with the general doctrine of responsi-
bility in the Draft. Medical writings approach consensus that homosexuality is
symptomatic of psychological disorder, stemming from a failure to achieve ma-
ture psychic development, and that it cannot be cured unless the underlying
psychological deviation is cured rsee the medical authorities summarized in
George, Legal, Medical and Psychiatric Considerations in the Control of Prostitu-
tion, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 717, 753-57 (1962) ; Sexual Behavior and the Law 434-77
(Slovenko ed. 1964)].
Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 2315-17, Comments at 186 (Final Draft 1967).
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cohabitation, and consensual homosexual activity is not punished
under the Illinois revision."8 7 Of course, activities disruptive of special
state interests, such as public solicitation, victimization of the im-
mature and forcible abuse would still be punished.88
The Proposed Code provision on abortion follows the general
pattern of the new California, North Carolina and Colorado statutes
and the recently proposed McCauley Bill.2 19 It would permit a physi-
cian to perform an abortion legally where he believes either the preg-
nancy resulted from rape or incest, the fetus would be born with grave
physical or mental defect or the abortion is necessary to preserve the
life or physical or mental health of the pregnant female. 290 These
justifications have been the subject of considerable debate in various
journals, and there would be little value in repeating the arguments
"pro" and "con" here.2 9 1 However, the Proposed Code does deviate
from similar proposals in several respects that are worth mentioning.
First, it does not require that the abortion be approved by more than
one physician.292 Ordinarily, abortions performed in hospitals must
be approved by committees of three or more physicians. The Commit-
tee favored this practice, but felt that any requirements concerning
the use and composition of such committees would best be left to
regulations issued by the Department of Public Health. The criminal
code is not an appropriate place for regulating the details of hospital
practice. 93 Second, the Proposed Code provision does not contain a
special requirement that the abortion be performed prior to the twenty-
sixth week of pregnancy.2 4 Again, this was considered primarily a
287. See notes 281 & 282 supra.
288. See, e.g., Mich. Rev. Crim. Code §§ 2315-17, 2320-21, 5540(c) (Final Draft
1967).
289. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25950-54 (Supp. 1967), complementing Cal.
Pen. Code §§ 274-76 (Supp. 1967); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-2-50 to -52 (Supp.
1967) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1967) ; Mich. S. 568, 74th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1967)
(McCauley Bill). For a thorough discussion of the California statute see Leavy and
Charles, California's New Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Analysis and Guide to Medical
and Legal Procedure, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1 (1967).
290. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 7015 (Final Draft 1967), the abortion would have
to be performed in a licensed hospital. Some concern has been expressed over the ab-
sence of an "emergency" provision authorizing abortion outside of a hospital when
necessary. The Committee was informed that "emergency abortions" just don't exist.
Radical surgery necessitated, for example, by an auto accident would not be viewed
as an "abortion" in a medical sense, particularly if the uterus had to be excised.
291. See authorities collected in Comment, Abortion Reform in Michigan-An
Analysis of the Proposed Code's Provisions, 14 Wayne L. Rev. p. 1006 infra.
292. Compare, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25951 (Supp. 1967); Model
Penal Code § 230.3(3) (Official Draft 1962).
293. Cf. Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 231, § 1, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 14.1171 (1956)
(regulating maternity hospitals).
294. See Comment, supra note 291, at 1028 n. 157; cf. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-
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matter of medical practice that should not be regulated by statute.
Very few abortions are undertaken after the twenty-sixth week and
then only under the most compelling danger to the female. Third,
the provision does not require that the prosecuting attorney be notified
when the aborted pregnancy was the product of rape.295 Ordinarily,
hospital committees would be most reluctant to accept an unsubstan-
tiated allegation of rape unless such a report was made. On the other
hand, requiring such reports as a matter of law would impose such
additional pressure on a rape victim that she might seek out a "quack"
rather than consult a qualified physician.
The Proposed Code also follows a recent trend in recognizing
mistake as to age as a defense to statutory rape.296 Under current
law, the male is not excused even if the female purposely lied about
her age.2 97 The result, in effect, is to make statutory rape a strict
liability offense. The Committee could find no justification for this
position which is at odds with our usual policy toward strict liability.298
The only real issue of concern was whether any honest mistake should
constitute an excuse or only an honest and "reasonable" mistake.290
The Committee viewed the objective standard as merely another means
of reducing the level of mens rea. Accordingly, it recognized any mis-
take as a defense. The practical significance of this decision is ques-
tionable, however, since a jury is unlikely to accept as honest any mis-
take that is patently unreasonable.
The Proposed Code provision on legal insanity, although described
by some as reflecting a basic change in policy, actually represents
2-50(4) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1967). Neither does the Proposed Code require consent of the
husband. Compare id. § 40-2-50(4) (a). This was thought inconsistent with normal
medical practice. While a doctor may well consider the husband's position, his pri-
mary responsibility must be to his patient (or "patients" if the fetus is also viewed in
this perspective).
295. Compare Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25952(a) (Supp. 1967).
296. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 2331 (Final Draft 1967). Compare People v.
Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964); III. Ann. Stat.
ch. 38, § 11-4(b) (Smith-Hurd 1964); 6 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-9-3 (1964). The term
"defense" is used loosely. The defendant has only the burden of injecting the issue, but
the prosecutor carries the burden of proof. Mich. Rev. Crhn. Code §§ 135(n), 2331(2)
(Final Draft 1967).
297. See People v. Gengels, 218 Mich. 632, 188 N.W. 398 (1922); Model Penal
Code § 207.4, Comment at 253 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). A contrary view is taken
under the statute prohibiting the "debauching" of a male under 15. See People v.
Bailey, 341 Mich. 592, 67 N.W.2d 785 (1954).
298. Cf. p. 791 & note 91 supra. A similar position is taken in the treatment of
mistake as to eligibility to marry under the bigamy provision. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code
§ 7001(2) (Final Draft 1967).
299. Compare Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 11-4(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1964) (reason-
able), with N.Y. Pen. Law § 130.10 (good faith).
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more of an extension of current principles. The present Michigan
standard for determining legal insanity is generally taken to be the
M'Naghten rule, though a recent survey indicated several trial judges
employ the Durham, American Law Institute (ALl) and Currens
tests."° Section 705 of the Proposed Code adopts the Currens test,
which along with the ALl standard, rests on the same basic premise
as M'Naghten--that the crucial factor is the defendant's ability to
control himself.30' Section 705 provides that "[a] person is not
criminally responsible for his conduct if at the time he acts, as a
,result of mental disease or defect, he lacks capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law."" 2 The Committee preferred this
standard because, by avoiding "judgmental terms like 'nature,'
'quality,' 'right' or 'wrong,'" it promotes "a full presentation of the
defendant's mental condition and a direct determination of the effect
of his condition on the ultimate question of criminal responsibility."
303
The original Currens standard referred to a lack of "substantial
capacity" to conform, but the Committee dropped the term "substan-
tial" in fear that it would give rise to the same kinds of technical
disputes as have plagued the M'Naghten test.304 For the same reason,
no attempt was made to provide a detailed definition of "mental
disease or defect. 30 In particular, the Committee rejected the ALl
provision excluding from the definition of disease any "abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social con-
duct.""' Although agreeing that legal insanity cannot be established
simply by showing repeated anti-social conduct, the Committee feared
300. People v. Krugman, 377 Mich. 559, 562, 141 N.W.2d 33, 34 (1966) suggests
that Michigan follows the M'Naghten test supplemented by irresistible impulse. How-
ever, the leading Michigan decision takes a very broad view of the "right-wrong"
standard. People v. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487, 29 N.W. 109 (1886). See also People v.
Beverly, 108 Mich. 509, 66 N.W. 379 (1896). Comment, The "Insanity" Defense Under
the Michigan Revised Criminal Code, 14 Wayne L. Rev. p. 863 infra.
Responses to the recent survey indicated seven circuit judges have instructed juries
under Durham, four under the ALI standard, and one under Currens. Lewin, The
Procedural Road to the Insanity Defense: A Field Study of the Practice of Michigan
Defense Attorneys and Prosecutors in Relation to the Defense of Insanity, June 1,
1967, at 31 (unpublished thesis in University of Michigan Law Library).
301. See United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774-76 (1961). The Durfee
standard, note 300 supra, specifically included the lack of "power to resist the impulse
to do the act." 62 Mich. at 493, 29 N.W. at 111.
302. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 705 (Final Draft 1967).
303. Id., Comment at 73-74.
304. Cf. the Committee position on the Durham test: "the so called 'Durham
Rule' ... is not at all incompatible with Michigan case law. But the Durham language
itself has created a number of difficulties of interpretation and application.' Id., Com-
ment at 74.
305. Id.
306. Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Official Draft 1962).
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that the ALI provision would be interpreted restrictively to bar a psy-
chiatrist from relying upon such conduct as the sole overt manifesta-
tion of a mental illness suggested by his examination.30 7 Again, the
Committee's objective was to avoid disputes over conclusional labels
and encourage full and complete testimony concerning the "develop-
ment, adaptation and functioning" of the defendant's "mental or emo-
tional processes and... behavior controls."3 '
The Proposed Code also institutes two basic changes relating to
the use of force in an arrest situation, although only one has received
much attention. Section 4625 provides that it is no defense to a charge
of resisting arrest "that the police officer was acting unlawfully in
making the arrest, providing he was acting under color of his official
authority." ' Under present law, the individual takes his chances
in attacking an officer who seeks to arrest him.310 If the arrest was
unlawful, there is no liability. But if arrest was lawful, then the indi-
vidual is liable no matter how honest or reasonable his mistaken
belief that it was illegal. The Committee's grounds for rejecting this
position are succinctly stated in its commentary:
The Committee believes ... that persons should not be encouraged
to resort to self-help to resist an arrest which they know is being
made by a peace officer in his official capacity. Even if a citizen
feels the arrest is unlawful, he should submit and rely upon his
legal remedies. The resort to force is an improper remedy that will
usually only lead to an escalation of force by the officer and result
in far greater injury to the actor than the improper arrest.
311
A similar concern about the escalation of force also led the Com-
mittee to suggest a modification of the peace officer's authority to use
deadly force in effecting an arrest. Current Michigan law on this
307. Compare United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 625 (2d Cir. 1966), with
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 761-63 (3d Cir. 1961). Such a restrictive inter-
pretation was not intended by the draftsmen of the ALI provision. See Model Penal
Code § 4.01, Comment at 160 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Nevertheless, the Committee
believed the language of the provision lent itself to such an interpretation, which might
pose serious constitutional questions under Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
See Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 705, Comment at 74 (Final Draft 1967).
308. See Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
309. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4625(2) (Final Draft 1967). A similar position is
taken in § 4506(2) (obstructing a peace officer). Cf. id. § 3310 (claim of right no
defense to robbery).
310. See People v. Krum, 374 Mich. 356, 132 N.W.2d 69 (1965); People v.
De Meaux, 194 Mich. 18, 160 N.W. 634 (1916); People v. Rounds, 67 Mich. 482, 35
N.W. 77 (1887).
311. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 4625, Comment at 365 (Final Draft 1967). The
Commentary goes on to emphasize that this provision would not apply where "the
actor apprehends bodily injury, as when the arresting officer uses unnecessary force
to make the arrest." Id.
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point is not entirely clear, but it would appear to permit the officer to
use deadly force when necessary to arrest a fleeing felon.3"' Law en-
forcement officials on the Committee generally agreed that this author-
ity was far too broad. If the choice comes down to shooting a passer
of bad checks or letting him escape, the officer will not risk taking the
man's life to enforce a comparatively minor felony. On the other hand,
if the fleeing felon is potentially a serious danger to others, and other
means of apprehension have failed, the use of deadly force is appro-
priate. 13 The Committee's difficulties arose in trying to identify those
fleeing felons who are potentially dangerous. The Proposed Code
originally authorized the officer to use deadly force only if he reason-
ably believed that the suspected felon had "committed or attempted
to commit a felony involving the use or threatened use of deadly
physical force."31 4 A subsequently adopted alternative extends this
authority to the arrest of any fleeing suspect reasonably believed to
have committed any "felony involving force against either person or
property."" 5 This would apply to persons suspected of burglary and
robbery even where there is no indication the felon is armed. The
advantages and disadvantages of both proposals have been fully dis-
cussed elsewhere. 310 Whether one prefers the original proposal or the
alternative, it is generally agreed that either is an improvement over
our present law.
312. See People v. Gonsler, 251 Mich. 443, 232 N.W. 365 (1930); cf. Firestone
v. Rice, 71 Mich. 377, 38 N.W. 885 (1888). This was the common law rule, 4 Blackstone
Commentaries *293, but it was developed at a time when felonies generally were
punishable by death. Some authorities suggest it would no longer be applicable to
minor felons. See Moreland, The Use of Force in Effecting or Resisting Arrest, 33
Neb. L. Rev. 40S, 412-15 (1954). See also Waite, Some Inadequacies in the Law of
Arrest, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 448, 463-68 (1931); 34 N.C.L. Rev. 122 (1955). Neither of
the Michigan cases cited speak directly to this point. Gonsler did not involve a police
officer, and Firestone did not involve deadly force.
313. President's Commission at 119.
314. Mich. Rev. Crim. Code § 630(2) (Final Draft 1967). This provision also
authorized the use of deadly force where necessary to effect the arrest of a person
who "otherwise indicates, except through a motor vehicle violation, that he is likely
to endanger human life or to inflict serious physical injury unless apprehended without
delay." Id. § 630(2) (b) (iii).
315. Alternative Draft § 630(2), was adpoted December 2, 1967, and does not
appear in the original publication of the Proposed Code. See note 1 supra. This provision
also permits the use of deadly force to "lawfully suppress a riot or insurrection." Also,
it probably should be amended to include part (iii) of the original § 630(2). See note
314 supra.
316. See Comment, Justifiable Force in Property Defense and Arrest Under the
Michigan Revised Criminal Code, 14 Wayne L. Rev. p. 847 infra, at 857-60 and author-
ities cited therein. The original proposal is similar to the New York provision that
was recently amended after lengthy debate. N.Y. Pen. Law § 35.30. See also Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 38, § 7-5(a) (Smith-Hurd 1964); Model Penal Code § 3.07, Comment at
55-63 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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Although the basic substantive changes are important, the heart
of the Proposed Code is the collective impact of the minor changes-
the consolidation of scattered provisions, the modernization of lan-
guage, the closing of loopholes, etc. Although the Committee believes
that these changes are significant improvements, it does not suggest
that the Proposed Code is perfect even on the most technical level.
Many ambiguities have been eliminated, but undoubtedly some also
have been created. Taken as a whole, however, the Proposed Code
should facilitate a more efficient and just administration of the criminal
law. This is particularly true of the modifications in penalty structure
that will be discussed in a later article.
Of course, while the substantive law is important, problems of
personnel and procedure are equally if not more important. The im-
provement of the administration of criminal justice must begin with
the adoption of a more rational and orderly criminal code; but it
cannot end there. The overall task of reform is large and difficult, but
not impossible. Above all, penal law reform needs the interest of a
wider segment of the bar, for improved administration of our most
basic law is not the responsibility merely of prosecutors, defense
counsel and judges, but of all lawyers.
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